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This thesis is comprised of two volumes. Volume I consists of the research 
component whilst Volume II comprises the written clinical component based on work 
completed during training. 
Volume I is comprised of a systematic meta-analysis, an empirical research 
paper and a press release. The meta-analysis reviews literature that investigated the 
impact of cognitive behavioural approaches on distress for those with a first or early 
episode psychosis. No main significant effect was found but, a significant effect was 
found within non-specialised services. The empirical research paper used 
interpretative phenomenological analysis to explore how visual hallucinations are 
experienced and made sense of within a schizophrenia spectrum diagnosis. Five 
superordinate themes were identified: ‘It’s not only a visual experience’, ‘Agency’, 
‘Role of others, ‘Coming to know the experience’ and ‘Creating a narrative’.  
Volume II is comprised of five clinical practice reports (CPRs). CPR1 presents 
the formulation of a young person with low self-esteem from both a cognitive-
behavioural and psychodynamic perspective.   CPR2 is a service evaluation 
exploring staff experiences of discharging families within the service framework of the 
Choice and Partnership Approach. CPR3 is a single case experimental design 
assessing the effectiveness of a behavioural intervention with a young boy with 
learning disabilities. CPR4 is a case study of an 81-year-old woman with anxiety who 
received cognitive-behavioural therapy. An abstract summarising CPR5, a clinical 
presentation of a young man with first episode psychosis who received 
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Do Cognitive Behavioural Approaches to First Episode Psychosis Change an 
Individual’s Experience of Distress Beyond that of Treatment as Usual? A 




Introduction: This systematic review and meta-analysis reviews the literature 
regarding the impact of cognitive behavioural approaches (CBA) on distress for 
people with first episode or early psychosis compared to treatment as usual. 
Acceptable measures of psychological distress were identified from the literature; 
measures of the impact of psychotic symptoms on distress were also acceptable.   
Method: Systematic searches yielded 14 studies to be meta-analysed. Information to 
calculate standard mean difference was extracted. Studies were rated for their 
methodological quality using a risk of bias tool. The quality of included studies was 
varied. Contamination bias and performance bias were domains with the most risk of 
bias.  
Analysis: The generic inverse variance random effects model was calculated. No 
significant effect main effect was found. The quality effects model was calculated and 
resulted in a 55% increase in treatment effect size which remained non-significant 
and negligible. Planned subgroup analyses were carried out: 1) Distress: 
hopelessness showed a significantly larger effect in the intervention condition, 2) 
Service context: a significant effect was found in non-specialised services.  
Conclusion: Outcomes suffered as the studies were not designed to measure 
distress or assess the impact of a specific therapy. Furthermore, the lack of effect 
2 
may be attributable to the use of specialist early-intervention services as treatment as 
usual; when the data was considered in light of service context an effect of CBA was 
found in non-specialised services.  
Future research: would benefit from using distress measures as a primary outcome 
and reporting distress subscales of PSYRATS. Therapies other than CBA would 
benefit from investigation to consider the unique contribution they could make to 
service users’ care.  
Clinical implications: selection of service users for CBA should be carefully 
considered to weigh up the return for the service user beyond that which they would 




Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Psychosis (CBTp) and Distress 
Cognitive behavioural therapy for psychosis (CBTp) is accepted as the 
recommended therapy for individuals struggling with psychosis and schizophrenia, 
including those experiencing a first episode of psychosis (National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE), (2014).  However, there has been debate in the 
literature regarding the best way to measure the effectiveness of CBTp. Primarily the 
debate has concerned whether outcome is best captured as symptom reduction or as 
changes in emotional experience: “The primacy of distress is a core principle of CBT, 
but CBT for psychosis has not always followed this, given its primary emphasis on 
psychosis outcomes.” (Birchwood & Trower, 2006 p. 107). 
Birchwood and Trower’s (2006) paper marked an important shift away from 
CBT as a ‘quasi-neuroleptic’ and a return to the human experience of emotion and 
distress as a primary outcome (Bernard, Jackson & Birchwood, 2015). This is now 
acknowledged in NICE guidance which recommends that CBT should include a focus 
on “reducing distress” (NICE, 2014 p. 23).  
A recent meta-analysis (Lincoln & Peters, 2019) considered the impact of 
cognitive behavioural approaches (CBA) to delusions and hallucinations. Twelve 
studies were eligible for review and most studies utilised a measure of distress as an 
outcome tool suggesting that literature in this area has indeed shifted.  
Distress and First Episode Psychosis (FEP) 
The literature investigating the use of CBT at the onset of psychosis has also 
suffered from a theoretical and philosophical missmatch between the focus of 
4 
outcome measurement and the core principles of the cognitive behavioural model 
(Morrison, 2009). Given the wide-ranging difficulties associated with the onset of 
psychosis (Birchwood, Todd & Jackson, 1998) the concept of distress is arguably in 
need of even more urgent attention than in those individuals with long standing 
psychotic symptoms. Furthermore, emotional experience has been foregrounded as 
a key underlying psychological process in the experience of psychosis (Vodušek, 
Parnas, Tomori, & Škodlar, 2014).     
Qualitative research into the experience of the onset of psychosis has 
identified multiple sources of distress that arise with this first episode. A recent meta-
synthesis (Griffiths, Mansell, Edge & Tai, 2019) of 33 first-person studies identified 
two superordinate themes: intrapersonal distress and interpersonal distress. 
Intrapersonal distress stemmed from the internal experience of the individual, seen in 
themes of unwanted internal states, conflicts and dilemmas, changes in sense of self 
and identity, disrupted goals and, physical health difficulties. Interpersonal distress 
arose from the individuals’ perceptions of their interactions with others. This was 
seen in themes of abusive and traumatic life experiences, contact with health care 
professionals, personal relationships and, stigma.  As such, recovery from early 
psychosis is arguably more complex than a reduction in a set of symptoms (Tan, 
Gould, Combes & Lehmann, 2014) and attention must be paid to the role of distress 
with the aim of reducing emotional dysfunction, rather than on symptom reduction 
(Bernard et al., 2015).   
The aim of CBT to reduce distress, rather than to reduce symptoms, is key not 
only for professional understanding but is an essential message for service users. 
Knowing what a therapy aims to change is a key ethical principle and will influence 
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expectations of therapy which are an important factor in therapeutic process and 
outcome (Greenberg, Constantino, & Bruce, 2006). 
What Constitutes Distress? 
The scope of this review is not broad enough to consider all the elements of 
distress described in the previous section. Nor is the literature advanced enough to 
report on or have the tools to quantitively measure all these elements of distress. As 
such, this review is limited to psychometrically valid and reliable psychological 
measures of distress that previous literature has identified as important in the 
psychosis population, specifically:   
• Bernard et al. (2015) argue that emotional dysfunction is best targeted 
through distress. Measures of anxiety, depression, social anxiety and 
trauma are identified to be useful and important facets of distress in the 
psychosis population (Bernard et al., 2015). Hopelessness, often 
associated with depression, has been identified as part of the pathway 
to emotional dysfunction in psychosis (Birchwood, 2003) and a key 
predictor of later outcomes in psychosis when the FEP population was 
followed longitudinally (Aguilar et al., 1997). 
• Self-esteem has been found to be a key element of distress in FEP 
(Vracotas, Schmitz, Joober, & Malla, 2007) and a strong predictor of 
functional recovery (Vracotas, Srividya, Iyer, Joober & Malla, 2012). 
• Broad measures of overall distress and distress caused by the 
symptoms of psychosis will be considered, as used in a recent meta-
analysis of CBT for schizophrenia (Laws, Darlington, Kondel, McKenna 
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& Jauhar 2018). Namely, the Global severity index of the SCL-90-R and 
the distress dimensions of the PSYRATS as identified by Woodward et 
al., (2014). 
These outcome measures fit well with Griffiths et al.’s (2019) superordinate theme of 
intrapersonal distress.  
What do we Mean by First Episode Psychosis? 
The notion of first episode psychosis as a distinct developmental stage began 
to be seen in the literature in the 1980s (Targum, 1983) when schizophrenia 
researchers were searching for a medically untreated population. Since then the term 
has developed to represent a broader understanding of psychosis that embraces 
diagnostic uncertainty (Farmer, 2010). Birchwood, Todd and Jackson (1998) 
identified the early phase of psychosis (i.e. the first two-five years following positive 
symptom onset) as a distinct and critical period during which time biological, social 
and psychological factors are most amenable to intervention. This led to the genesis 
of specialist early intervention for psychosis services that take advantage of this 
critical period to offer early access to support with the aim of improving long term 
outcomes.  
Examination of the literature suggests that ‘first-episode’ has been interpreted 
and applied in many ways. Breitborde, Srihari and Woods (2009) identified three key 
operational definitions that summarised the majority of the interpretations of ‘first-
episode’: (i) first treatment contact with services; (ii) duration of antipsychotic 
medication use; (iii) duration of psychosis.  
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The first of these refers to the first time a person receives clinical treatment for 
psychosis and is not equivalent to first attempts to seek help from services. The 
second refers to the duration of untreated psychosis (DUP), the reduction of which is 
a routine EIP service goal and identifies a first episode of psychosis as one which 
has yet to be treated with anti-psychotics. There is variation in the accepted duration 
of use of anti-psychotic medication to be considered ‘first-episode’: from a cut-off of 
no more than three days (Emsley, 1999), to less than six months use (Murray et al., 
2008). The third of these definitions, duration of psychosis, identifies a person to be 
in their ‘first episode’ if they have experienced psychotic symptoms for less than a 
specified amount of time. One challenge of this definition is that it relies on service 
users and their carers to accurately identify the onset of psychotic symptoms. Whilst 
this can be mitigated with measures and experienced clinical skills, a furthermore 
challenging difficulty is that the literature does not agree on an end point for a first 
episode. The critical period hypothesis would suggest that the end point would be 
some two to five years after symptom onset. However, there is not yet enough 
evidence to validate an appropriate temporal cut off within this two to five-year period 
(Breitborde et al., 2009). 
Evidently there is considerable variation in the literature regarding how to 
define a ‘first episode’ of psychosis. Typically, the term is used to describe: 
“individuals early in the course of a psychotic illness or treatment rather than 
individuals who are truly in the midst of a first ‘episode’ of illness.”  (Breitborde et al., 
2009 pp 259). 
The current review embraces the fluidity of this terminology to reflect the 
current state of the literature, and clinical practice. As such the review will consider 
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populations described as both ‘first episode’ and early psychosis as seen in Morrison 
(2009). Early psychosis was taken to be anything within the critical period of less 
than five years (Birchwood, Todd & Jackson, 1998). Further to this, participants who 
are under the care of specialised EIP services were eligible for the review (as was 
seen in Griffiths et al., 2019). These criteria makes the findings directly applicable to 
individuals experiencing first episode/early psychosis, and to those providing their 
care.  
CBTp or Cognitive Behavioural Approaches?  
The distinction of CBT for psychosis (CBTp) from the CBT model applied to 
reduce distress in individuals experiencing psychosis is somewhat hazy. A recent 
systematic review of cognitive behavioural approaches for symptoms of psychosis 
identified a tendency for research groups to brand and package their therapy for 
psychosis in idiosyncratic ways when there is little discernible difference between the 
therapies (Lincoln & Peters, 2019).  Furthermore, Hayes and Hofmann (2017) argue 
that the therapeutic process of reducing distress should be emphasised, rather than 
“trademarked intervention protocols” within diagnostic categories (Hayes & Hofmann, 
2017. pp 245).  Therefore, in line with Hayes and Hofmann (2017) the current study 
will follow Lincoln and Peters (2019) and focus on CB approaches rather than on 
CBTp.  
Review Question 
The aim of this review is to answer the following question: What impact do 
cognitive behavioural approaches have on the distress felt by people during their 
first/early episode of psychosis, above that of routine care?  
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The ‘PICO’ framework (Population, Intervention, Control and Outcome) was 
used to develop the research question and search terms due as recommended by 
the Cochrane collaboration (Higgins & Green, 2011).   
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Systematic Search Method 
Electronic Database Search  
A systematic search of the literature was carried out in March 2018.  The 
search terms were guided by those used in a similar review (Lincoln & Peters, 2019) 
that reviewed distress and symptom reduction following cognitive behavioural 
approaches for delusions and hallucinations. The search terms used for the current 
systemic review are detailed in Table 1 below. The databases Psychinfo, CINAHL, 
Medline and Web of Science were used to search the literature using the terms in 
Table 1. 
Distress was too broad a construct to be usefully included in the search terms. 
Therefore, distress was hand searched for in the full text of the articles after the title 
screen had been completed.  
Table 1 
Search terms used for systematic review of the literature  
Construct (and 


























3 "Early psychosis" 
"first episode psychosis" 










"early intervention for 
psychosis" 





4 N/A N/A N/A 
Note: Limiters of peer reviewed journal and human subjects were used where possible. 
Searches were not limited by full text or language 
 
Excluding the second search term, which relates to the ‘approaches’ element 
of the title, was considered. However, preliminary searches without ‘approaches’ 
search terms did not yield any additional articles. It was therefore decided to include 
the ‘approaches’ search strategy to map the search terms as closely as possible to 
the research question.  
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria  
Full inclusion and exclusion criteria are detailed below in Table 2. In order to 
gain an overview of the impact that cognitive behavioural approaches have on 
distress for people experiencing a first episode of psychosis the criteria were fairly 
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broad. This is due to the heterogeneity and relative youth of the literature. The main 
criteria were any controlled intervention study where the intervention utilities cognitive 
and/or behavioural approaches with people who meet the criteria for a first 
episode/early psychosis.  
Table 2 
Inclusion criteria and rationale 




Studies must have a sample of 
participants who have a first 
episode of psychosis or who 
meet the criteria for a specialist 
early intervention in psychosis 
(EIP) service. These specialist 
services provide care to those 
experiencing a first episode of 
psychosis.  
 
Where a mixed population is 
sampled, for example, FEP and 
chronic schizophrenia the data 
for the two population groups 
must be identifiable and 
separable.    
 
Studies that did not provide 
enough detail for the participant 
sample to be adequately 





As in Griffiths et al., (2019) this criterion allows the 
findings to be directly applicable to services providing 
care for those experiencing a first episode of psychosis. 
The more flexible criteria of suitability for EIP services 
gathers clinically relevant data and is reflective of the 
varied definition of “first episode” in the research 




To reduce heterogeneity in the sample and facilitate the 






These studies did not allow the relevance of the sample 




Participants that are classed as 
ultra high risk/at risk mental 
state were excluded 
These participants do not allow the review question to 




A cognitive behavioural 
intervention incorporating belief 
modification work and/or 
behavioural/experiential work.  
The intervention may include 
other therapeutic elements and 
need not be focused 
specifically on psychosis.  
 
The intervention must have 
been  





These criteria reflect the heterogeneity of the literature 
in this population. It allows some specificity to be 
maintained whilst including interventions outside of 
formal “CBTp” of which there are few suitable studies in 
this population.  
Examples include the involvement of family members 
and focus on substance use. 
 
 
Studies where the intervention was provided to family 
members in the service user’s absence were excluded. 
It is not possible to assess the impact of the CB 





Distress must be reported on 
by the participant using 
validated and standardized 
outcome measures of distress 





To allow the findings of the review to answer the review 
question with validity.  
Outcome data 
 
The studies are required to 
report either Means and 
 
 
To ensure that outcomes can be calculated into an 
effect size.  
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Standard Deviations, or F- Test 
statistics, Cohen’s d effect size 









These articles do not allow for the effect of the cognitive 
behavioural intervention to be assessed separately to 
standard care, which in EIP services may include family 
therapy, medication and case management.  
 
Type of article  
 
The following article types were 
excluded: meta-analysis, 
theoretical papers, reviews, 
commentaries, opinion pieces, 
study protocol, clinical 
guidance, non-outcome 
focused studies, case studies 




These articles do not provide the outcome data needed 
for this meta-analysis.  
 
 
Several large trials were excluded from the current review. Examples of these 
include SUPEREDEN (Fowler et al., 2018), OPUS (Jørgensen, Nordentoft, Abel, 
Gouliaev, Jeppesen, & Kassow, 2000), SOCRATES (Lewis et al., 2002) and the 
COMMAND trial (Birchwood et al., 2014). Reasons included a mixture of distress 
measures not reported, type of data not suitable for meta-analysis and participants 




Results of Systematic Search 
The results of the systematic search are presented in Figure 1. The search 
identified 546 articles which was reduced to 318 once duplicates were removed. 
These articles were then screened by title which excluded 79 studies and then by 
abstract which excluded a further 125. The three most common reasons for exclusion 
at this stage were non-interventional studies, opinion pieces and reviews.  The 
remaining 114 articles were screened in detail yielding 17 studies that could be 
eligible for review. The reference lists of these 17 articles and of relevant reviews 
were screened. A google scholar search was also undertaken. Four further articles 
were identified from these additional sources, thus yielding 21 potentially eligible 
studies. This 21 included 2 studies that did not have full English texts available and 5 
studies that reported summary scores of outcome measures that could be used to 
calculate distress if the full data was available. The authors of these 7 studies were 
contacted via email. Unfortunately, these authors did not respond. This left 14 







Figure 1. Study selection: Adapted PRISMA flow diagram (Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, 
Altman, 2009)  
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Data Extraction and Quality Ratings 
Data Extraction 
 All data was extracted by the author. The reliability of quality ratings was 
cross validated by a second rater using a 15% random sample. Items where 
disagreements occurred were discussed and final ratings were agreed. 
Preference of data to be extracted. It is anticipated that treatment outcome 
will be reported as a mean or mean difference, a standard deviation and number of 
participants (n) for each of a treatment and control group. From these Cohen’s d 
effect size and standard error will be calculated for each eligible outcome measure. If 
standard deviations for each group are not reported individually the pooled standard 
deviation may be substituted. If means, standard deviation and n-sizes are not 
reported inferential test statistics will be transformed into estimates of Cohen’s d. 
Finally, if neither summary statistics nor inferential test statistics are reported then 
effect sizes as calculated within the primary studies will be considered. It should be 
noted that effects sizes as reported in primary studies are frequently calculated from 
data that has been adjusted for the association with one or more covariates. Such 
adjustments may result in dissimilarity with the effects reported within the other 
primary studies. The contribution of adjusted effect size to overall heterogeneity will 
be examined empirically if problematic heterogeneity is identified in the random 
effects model.  
For clarity, effect size directions will be altered so that a negative effect size 
(reduction in score) represents an improvement across all measures. Specifically, 
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this was applied to outcome measures assessing self-esteem (Jackson, Trower et 
al., 2009 c; Lecomte et al., 2008). 
Reporting multiple outcomes from a primary study. It is anticipated that 
some studies will report more than one measure of distress. In these cases, all 
measures meeting the definition of distress as described in the section ‘What 
constitutes distress’ will be extracted and multiple effect sizes will be included in the 
meta-analysis. Multiple effect sizes from one study will be differentiated by alphabetic 
characters. The inclusion of multiple effect sizes from a primary study may result in a 
slight reduction in confidence intervals for the random effects model by artificially 
inflating the sample size within the meta-analysis, i.e. this will increase type I error.  
Measures from the same study were not combined to allow subgroup analysis of the 
different elements of the broader concept of distress.  
It is anticipated that some studies may report multiple depression measures 
such as both the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and the Calgary Depression Scale 
(CDS). The CDS has stronger validity than the BDI in the target population, due in 
part to the confound of negative symptoms (Kim, Kim, Yoon, Kim, Shin, Hwang, & 
Yoon, 2006). Therefore, in studies where a more psychometrically sound measure is 
used, such as the CDS, only the CDS data is extracted.  In studies where the only 
measure of depression reported was the BDI this data will be extracted and the 
impact on validity is reflected in the ‘detection bias’ domain of the quality rating.  
Quality Ratings 
Quality appraisal tool. A quality appraisal tool was designed to assess risk of bias 
within this literature.  The Cochrane Collaboration’s tool for assessing risk of bias in 
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randomised trials (Higgins et al., 2011) and the Risk of Bias Assessment Tool for 
Non-randomised Studies (Kim et al., 2013) were modified to include questions of 
generalisability, contamination bias and treatment fidelity. The framework assessed 
risk of bias across nine domains: Selection bias, performance bias, contamination 
bias, treatment fidelity, detection bias, attrition bias, reporting bias, and 
generalisability. Each extracted effect size was assessed on each domain and given 




Quality appraisal tool 
Domain 
Low risk of 
Bias 
Unclear risk of 
bias 





individual level.   
Demographics 






for OR differences 
between groups 
were found to 







reported and no 
significant differences 
between groups OR 
differences were 
controlled for OR 
differences between 
groups were found to 







between groups at 
baseline and are 
likely to have an 




Low risk of 
Bias 
Unclear risk of 
bias 
High risk of 
bias 
Performance 








(e.g. length of 
intervention or 








Clear attempt to 
measure and/or 
compensate for 
impact of social 
desirability. 
Unclear if allocation 





Non-reporting of how 
social desirability was 
either measured or 
compensated for.  










are present but 
not controlled for. 
Social desirability 
measured and 
shown to have an 
effect yet not 










Control condition not 
clearly described, 
unclear if elements of 
intervention and 
control conditions 
cross over.  
Control condition 
contains elements 




Low risk of 
Bias 
Unclear risk of 
bias 






















undertaken but not 
described/evaluated. 






No mention of 
treatment fidelity 
tests or processes 


















measure used.  
No reporting of 
whether outcome 
assessors were blind 
to allocation. Unclear 
validity/reliability. 
Measure created for 
the study and 
reliability/validity not 
reported.  




of measures used.  
Attrition Bias 




treat analysis.  
Unclear reporting and 
handling of attrition. 
Reasons for missing 
data not provided  
Reason for 
attrition is likely to 
be related to true 
outcome. 
OR attrition is 
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Domain 
Low risk of 
Bias 
Unclear risk of 
bias 
High risk of 
bias 
OR No or low 
attrition  
OR Reasons for 
attrition unlikely to 




OR Attrition is 
balanced across 
both groups with 
similar reasons. 














of measures as 
outlined in the 
method.  




Not reported full 
outcome 
measures as 
stated in the 
method section/ 





when full scale 
has been 
administered. One 





Low risk of 
Bias 
Unclear risk of 
bias 








(>20 per group). 
Demographics 
reported and are 
representative 
with no areas of 
bias. 
Sufficient sample for 
generalisation but 
with either one or two 
idiosyncratic features 




(<20 per group). 
OR more than two 
idiosyncratic 
features and 
issues with overall 
demographics.  
 
Results of Quality Appraisal Tool 
The quality appraisal judgements are summarised below by domain. Unless 
otherwise stated all effect sizes taken from a study were given the same rating and 
are described by study. Difference in ratings within a study is seen in the domain of 
detection bias due to the differing psychometric properties of the outcome measures 
used. A visual summary of the quality ratings is presented in Figure 2 for each effect 
size. A limitation of this quality appraisal tool is that a study could meet several 
criteria across more than one level of risk within a domain of bias. Where this was the 
case a judgement had to made by the researcher. This judgement was made on an 
individual, study by study basis (or where applicable effect size by effect size basis). 
If there was uncertainty regarding a study’s level of risk for a particular domain of 
bias the researcher’s judgement was cautious, and a higher level of risk was 
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allocated. For example, if a study met both low and unclear risk it would be allocated 




Figure 2.  Summary of quality criteria applied to each effect size. Red indicates high risk of 
bias, amber an unclear risk of bias and green a low risk of bias. 
Note: a, b, c versions of each study refers to different effect sizes extracted from the same 
study as described in the ‘Reporting multiple outcomes from a primary study’ section. 
 Note: Quality index is calculated by allocating low, unclear or high risk of bias as 0, 1 or 2 
points respectively for each domain. Percentage is then calculated by dividing the total points 




 Selection bias. Overall selection bias was mixed with five studies rated as low 
risk, seven as unclear risk and two as high risk. The low risk studies used true 
randomisation and had no significant differences in demographics at baseline 
(Edwards et al., 2006; Gleeson et al., 2009; Jackson, Trower et al., 2009; Power et 
al., 2003; & Uzenoff et al., 2008). 
Seven studies were rated as unclear risk due to a mixture of randomisation 
method (pseudo/non-randomisation) and unclear or no significant differences 
between groups at baseline. One study (Jackson, McGorry et al., 2005) was non-
randomised; the researchers allocated participants to groups. Two studies were 
judged to be at high risk of bias due to differences at baseline between the groups on 
the outcomes of treatment effect and to influential demographic differences such as 
educational attainment and diagnosis (Jackson, McGorry et al., 1998) or problematic 
alcohol abuse (Kemp et al., 2007).  
 Performance bias. Overall this domain had the second largest risk of bias 
across studies. No studies had low risk of bias in this domain. The majority of studies 
(eight of the fourteen) had unclear risk of bias (Barrowclough et al., 2014; Fowler et 
al., 2009; Gleeson et al., 2009; Jackson, Trower et al., 2009; Penn et al., 2011; 
Power et al., 2003; Uzenoff et al., 2008; & Madigan et al., 2013). These eight studies 
did not report on concealment of group allocation from participants. Six studies had a 
high risk of bias where allocation was not concealed from the participant (Edwards et 
al., 2006; Jackson, McGorry et al., 1998; Jackson, McGorry et al., 2005; Kemp et al., 
2007; Lecomte et al., 2008; & Morrison., 2018). None of the studies reported on 
social desirability. 
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Contamination bias. This domain contained the highest risk of bias. It should 
be noted that the majority of studies (ten of the fourteen) (Barrowclough et al., 2014; 
Edwards et al., 2006; Gleeson et al., 2009; Jackson, McGorry et al., 1998; Jackson, 
McGorry et al., 2005; Kemp et al., 2007; Morrison et al., 2018; Penn et al., 2011; 
Power et al., 2003; Madigan et al., 2013) had a design problem due to being carried 
out in the context of specialised early psychosis services. In these services TAU 
(which was provided to both groups) included access to psychosocial interventions 
including cognitive behavioural techniques from specialised care coordinators, family 
therapy and social groups. This TAU introduces contamination of cognitive 
behavioural approaches across the groups and the confounding variables of family 
therapy, social groups and specialist knowledge of case managers. Whilst these 
options of support and therapy are available to both intervention and control 
conditions the uptake of these is not reported on in either condition. The remaining 
four studies were carried out in either secondary care mental health services where 
TAU was described as medication with case management (Fowler et al., 2009; & 
Jackson, Trower et al., 2009) or outpatient clinic where TAU was described as either 
medication with supportive therapy (Uzenoff et al., 2008) or medication alone 
(Lecomte et al., 2008).  
 Treatment fidelity. The distribution of risk across the studies was fairly 
balanced with six studies at a high risk of bias, four studies at an unclear risk of bias, 
and four studies at a low risk of bias. Threats to treatment fidelity tended to come 
from a lack of formal measures of treatment fidelity being reported on (Edwards et al, 
2006; Fowler et al, 2009; Jackson, McGorry et al, 1998; Jackson, McGorry et al, 
2005; Kemp et al, 2008; Morrison et al, 2018; Power et al, 2003; & Madigan et al, 
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2013) and/or a variety of differently qualified and trained mental health practitioners 
delivering the intervention (Fowler et al, 2009; Gleeson et al, 2009; Jackson, 
McGorry et al, 1998, 2005; Kemp et al, 2008; Morrison et al, 2018; Uzenoff et al, 
2008) . In some studies, such as Penn et al., (2011) the mixture of practitioners:  
social workers and clinical psychologists, was mitigated for by training, good fidelity 
reporting, and detailed supervision. As such, this study was judged to be low risk.  
 Detection bias. This domain showed different risk of bias within studies 
depending on the outcome measure used. As such it is summarised by effect sizes 
rather than by study. Of the five effect sizes rated as high risk of bias four were due 
to the use of the BDI which has poor validity in the target population (Edwards et al, 
2006; Fowler et al c, 2009; Jackson, McGorry et al., a, 1998; & Jackson, McGorry et 
al., a, 2005). The remaining study at high risk (Kemp et al, 2008) did not blind 
assessors to allocation. The remaining 19 effect sizes were judged to be at low risk 
of detection bias.  
 Attrition bias. Two studies were at high risk of bias. Kemp et al., (2008) used 
completer analysis and had unbalanced attrition with more participants dropping out 
of the control group, likely because they had not been randomised to the intervention. 
Madigan et al., (2013) reported completer data and had attrition greater than 25% 
which was unbalanced across groups.  Overall attrition rates were variable. However, 
the studies were generally consistent at providing reasons for drop-outs and 
providing adequate controls for this, including intention-to-treat analyses and 
reporting differences between completers and non-completers. 
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 Selective reporting bias. Generally, studies fully reported their measures and 
risk of reporting bias was mostly low. However, two studies were at high risk of bias: 
Jackson, Trower et al., (2009) & Power et al., (2003). These two studies did not 
report some of the outcome measures they described in the methodologies.  
 Generalisability. Risk of bias was mixed in this domain. Three studies had a 
high risk of bias due to generalisability (Kemp et al., 2008; Penn et al., 2011; & 
Uzenoff et al., 2008). All three of these studies had a small sample of less than 20 
participants. Kemp et al., (2008) and Uzenoff et al., (2008) also used samples with an 
idiosyncratic feature. In the former participants had to accept that they had 
problematic substance use. As such this is likely to represent a more insightful and 
change ready population. In the later, participants were excluded if they had a 
substance dependence, something that is common amongst the target population 
(Lechner, Dahne, Chen, Pickover, Richards, Daughters, & Lejuez, 2013). 
One study had unclear risk (Fowler et al, 2009) due to one idiosyncratic 
feature of their inclusion criteria: Participants had to have a formal diagnosis such as 
schizophrenia, schizo-affective disorder, bipolar disorder or psychotic depression and 
were excluded if they had the more diagnostically uncertain first episode psychosis. 
However, examination of the participant characterises revealed participants to be 
young people (mean age of 29 years) with a mean duration of onset of psychosis to 
be less than five years. Thus, fitting within the ‘critical period’ (Birchwood, Todd & 
Jackson, 1998) and meeting the criteria for treatment to be offered by UK early 
intervention services within the first 3-5 years of psychosis developing (National 
Institute for Mental Health in England, 2008). Whilst this sample can be argued to 
meet the current meta-analysis inclusion criteria, if applied liberally, it is somewhat 
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unclear if the participants are ‘typical’ of the FEP population and therefore this study 
has been rated to have an unclear risk of bias for generalisability.  
Summary. Overall the risk of bias was mixed across the studies. Two studies 
did not report high risk of bias in any domains (Barrowclough et al., 2014; & Gleeson 
et al., 2009).  There was notably high risk in the four domains of: Contamination bias 
and performance bias where no studies had low risk; In treatment fidelity six studies 
had high risk; Finally, in Detection bias five studies had high risk and the remainder 
low risk. These four domains question the validity of the study designs to accurately 
measure the specific impact of the intervention. The included studies are 
representative of the research literature in this area at the time of writing and 
therefore are included despite high and unclear risks of bias.  
 
Characteristics and Summary of Meta-Analysed Studies. 
The construct of distress measured and the number of participants for each 
extracted effect size is summarised in Table 4. As can be seen from Table 4 a variety 
of self-report distress measures were reported. However, distress as a direct result of 
psychotic symptoms (e.g. as measured by PSYRATS) was not reported in the 
literature. A subgroup analysis will be completed to better understand the sensitivity 
of the subcategories of distress to cognitive behavioural approaches. The details of 
the primary studies and the participant demographics for each primary study included 
in this review are shown in Tables 5 and 6 respectively. This review aimed to explore 
the impact of CBA on distress in first or early episode psychosis. The emphasis of the 
research question is focused on distress and the specific early psychosis population 
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therefore no limitation was placed on the target of the intervention. The number of 
eligible studies identified was relatively small, consequently adding additional limiters 
may have been overly specific and could have resulted in an unreviewable number of 
studies. Furthermore, this wide range of intervention targets is representative of the 
literature at the current time and follows the precedent set by Morrison (2009). 
An important consideration of the reviewed studies is that the service context 
in which they were conducted resulted in an inherent confounding variable. Namely, 
that EIP services provide treatment as usual that includes access to active therapy 
(family therapy), social support groups and, specialised psychosis case management 
that includes cognitive behavioural techniques. Whilst attempts were made to control 
for this in the primary studies via the presence of the control condition the access to 
the different support was not reported on and therefore could not be properly 
controlled for. The impact of the service context will therefore be investigated through 
a subgroup analysis.  
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Table 4 
Measure of Treatment Effect Reported for each Extracted Outcome Measure 











Barrowclough et al., 2014  
ST, a 
CDS Depression 51 0.48 
Barrowclough et al., 2014 
ST, b 
BAI Anxiety 52 -0.13 
Barrowclough et al., 2014 
LT, a 
CDS Depression 47 0.00 
Barrowclough et al., 2014 
LT, b 
BAI Anxiety 45 -0.05 
Edwards et al., 2006 BDI-SF Depression 47 -0.23 
Fowler et al., 2009 a BHS Hopelessness 71 -0.28 
Fowler et al., 2009 b BAI Anxiety 71 -0.02 
Fowler et al., 2009 c  BDI Depression 71 -0.07 
Gleeson et al., 2009 MADRS Depression 81 -0.24 
Jackson, McGorry et al., 
1998 a 
BDI-SF Depression 65 0.81 




Distress 65 0.56 
Jackson, McGorry et al., 
2005 a 
BDI-SF Depression 91 0.10 




Distress 91 0.04 
Jackson, Trower et al., 
2009 a 
IES Trauma 66 -0.35 
Jackson, Trower et al., 
2009 b 
CDS Depression 66 -0.29 
Jackson, Trower et al., 
2009 c 
RSEQ Self-esteem 66 -0.02 
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Kemp et al., 2007  DASS Negative affect 16 0.00 
Lecomte et al., 2008 SERS-SF Self-esteem 75 -0.40 
Morrison et al., 2018 a HADS-
Anx 
Anxiety 49 -0.70 
Morrison et al., 2018 b HADS-
Dep 
Depression 49 -0.49 
Penn et al., 2011 CDS Depression 46 -0.07 
Power et al., 2003 BHS Hopelessness  42 -0.69 
Uzenoff et al., 2008 CDS Depression 24 -0.53 
Madigan et al., 2013 CDS Depression 87 0.02 
Note: A negative effect size represents a reduction in distress and favours the 
intervention 
 CDS: Calgary Depression Scale. BAI: Beck Anxiety Inventory. BDI-SF: Beck Depression 
Inventory- Short Form. BHS: Beck Hopelessness Scale. BDI: Beck Depression Inventory. 
MADRS: Montgomery–Åsberg Depression Rating Scale. SCL90-R:  Symptom Checklist 90 
Revised GSI: Global Severity Index. IES: Impact of Events Scale. RSEQ: Rosenberg Self Esteem 
Questionnaire. DASS: Depression Anxiety Stress Scale. SERS-SF: Self Esteem Rating Scale- 
Short Form. HADS-Anx: Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale- Anxiety: HADS-Dep:  Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale- Depression 
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Table 5  
Study details presented by study 
Study Name Study information 














































1:1 10 13 











1:1 12 39.1 




CBT for relapse 
prevention 






























1:1 52 52 
Jackson, 














1:1 11 26.1 




Brief CBT “Stop 






1:1 5 26.1 
Lecomte et 
al., 2008 
Psychosis Group CBT for 
psychosis 
Medication Group 24 13 
Morrison et 
al., 2018 
Psychosis CBT Medication 1:1 14.39 26.1 
































1:1 10 10 

























MI & CBT Medication + 
Case 
management 
Group 12 12 
Note: All intervention conditions also contained the control condition (TAU) with the 
exception of Uzenoff et al., (2008) which is marked with a *. This study intervention 
contained outpatient treatment as usual whilst the control condition contained outpatient 
TAU + supportive therapy. 
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Table 6 
Participant details presented by study 
Study Name Participant information 







































































































disorder:  1% 
Jackson, 
McGorry et 






































































Not reported Not 
reported 
Schizophrenia 
spectrum: Int= 54% 
Control =54% 
Mood disorder with 
psychotic features: 
Int =21% Control= 
17% 
PDNOS: Int= 25% 
Control =29% 
Morrison et 





9 months Not 
reported  
FEP: 100% 
Other diagnosis not 
reported (PANSS 
reported) 






4 months Not 
reported 
Not reported  









Not reported  Not 
reported 
Not reported  
















































*PDNOS: psychotic disorder not otherwise specified 
*NOS: Not otherwise specified.  
(a): DUP estimated between reported onset of symptoms and entry to service. 
**converted to % from mean. 
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Analytic Strategy 
The Omnibus Test 
The summary effect size and 95% confidence intervals (CI) were calculated 
using the random effects (RE) model. The RE model accounts for variation between 
studies as a result of idiosyncrasies in the methodologies of the primary studies, as is 
commonly seen in psychological research (Borenstein, Hedges & Rothstein, 2007). 
The inverse variance RE model was calculated using the DerSimonian and Laird 
(1986) method.  
Cohen’s d has been shown to systematically overestimate the absolute value 
of the standard mean difference in small samples (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins 
2009). Accordingly, all calculations were performed on a transformation of Cohens d 
(i.e., Hedges g) which controls for this slight overestimation. For the sake of clarity all 
figures and tables are back transformed into Cohen d.  
 
The Quality Effects Model 
The quality effects (QE) model (Doi, Barendregt, Khan, Thalib & Williams, 
2015a) is a meta-analytic model that extends the random effects model. The QE 
model includes the rating of methodological quality for each study. In this review the 
QE model was calculated using the total score from the risk of bias scores as rated 
by the author and reported in the section ‘Results of quality appraisal tool’. The QE 
model controls for methodological bias and can be interpreted as the meta-analytic 
synthesis that would have been obtained if all the studies had been of the same 
methodological quality as the best study in the review.  
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Handling Problematic Variance  
An effect is considered heterogeneous if it presents with variation from the 
meta-analytic effect size that cannot be attributed to true variation in treatment 
outcome. Heterogeneity can result from methodological variation in the studies, 
measurement error or uncontrolled individual difference factors within the reviewed 
literature. Higgins I2 is a commonly used measure of heterogeneity, with greater 
values of I2 indicating variation in effect that cannot be attributed to true variation in 
the treatment effect. Heterogeneity of over 50% is considered substantial by the 
Cochrane collaboration (Higgins & Green, 2011). As such, for the purpose of this 
review problematic heterogeneity was defined as a Higgins I2 of over 50%. 
If problematic heterogeneity is observed three subsequent analyses with be 
completed to investigate causes of this heterogeneity. These will be:  
1) A ‘leave-one-out’ analysis: To examine whether any particular study or studies 
are exerting a disproportionately high influence on the overall meta-analytic 
effect by sequentially omitting effect sizes from the meta-analysis. Any effect 
size that exerted a disproportionately influential effect on the meta-analytic 
synthesis will be reviewed for possibility of exclusion due to the risk of bias it 
introduces.  
2) A subgroup analysis: To evaluate the variance in different subgroup mean 
effect size around the grand meta-analytic effect size. Studies will be grouped 
for subgroup analysis by service context, and by distress construct (as 
outlined in the section ‘Characteristics and summary of meta-analysed 
studies.’).  
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3) Meta regression will be used to attempt to identify whether uncontrolled 
continuous variables such as year of publication or participant demographics 
influenced the size of the intervention effect. 
 If heterogeneity is found to be low, these analyses are not essential. 
Publication Bias and Small Study Effects 
A funnel plot will be used to assess the spread of treatment effects around the 
meta analytic synthesis in relation to standard error. Publication bias and small study 
effects will be identified through visual and statistical inspection of the funnel plot.   
In the absence of publication bias, it is assumed that studies with high 
precision will be plotted near the average (i.e., the meta analytic synthesis), and 
studies with low precision will be spread evenly on both sides of the average, 
creating a roughly funnel-shaped distribution where the distance from the average is 
inversely proportionate to the precision of the study. A symmetric inverted funnel 
shape arises from a 'well-behaved' data set, in which publication bias is unlikely. 
Deviation from this shape can indicate publication bias especially if there is an 
absence of studies in the region associated with small samples sizes and non-
significant effects. 
If publication bias is identified, then a trim and fill procedure (Duval & Tweedle, 
2000a; Duval & Tweedle, 2000b) will be undertaken to yield an unbiased estimate of 
the effect size. In addition, the fail-safe N will also be calculated (Rosenthal, 1979). 
The fail-safe N is an estimation of the number of missing studies (often known as ‘file 
drawer’ studies) that would need to be retrieved for the effect to be no longer 
significant. If this number is large (relative to the number of primary studies in the 
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meta-analysis) then the omnibus test can be considered robust to the effects of 
publication bias.  
Results of Data Analysis 
Main Effect 
The treatment effects of the primary studies are reported in Table 4. There 
were 14 studies reporting a total of 24 effect sizes (multiple effect sizes from the 
same study are denoted by a, b, c etc) and 1434 participants.  
A random effects models was calculated using the generic inverse variance 
method. The random effects model showed a non-significant omnibus effect of d=-
0.09 (z = -1.34, p = 0.18) and a 95% confidence interval of between -0.23 to 0.04 
(studies = 14, participants = 1434). The results can be seen in the forest plot in 
Figure 3. This suggests that there is a small but statistically non-significant effect 
favouring the CB intervention.  
Heterogeneity of variance attributed to non-effect factors as measured by 
Higgins I2 was low, I2= 40%. This was deemed not problematic.  Given the 
nonsignificant effect without problematic variance further analysis of heterogeneity is 
not required. Nevertheless, in the interest of probing the literature we will examine 
attenuation due to methodological quality and the treatment effect in specific 





Impact of Methodological Variance 
The QE model was used to assess the impact of methodological bias within 
the reviewed literature upon the treatment effect. The QE model reported a synthesis 
of d= -0.14 (z=-1.85, p=0.06) and a 95% confidence interval of between -0.28 to 0.01 
(studies =14, participants =1434). Thus, the meta analytic treatment effect remains 
non-significant. The results can be seen in the forest plot for the QE model in Figure 
4 below.  
Favours the intervention Favours the control 
Figure 3. Forest plot of main meta-analytic effect 
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The quality effects model evidences an approximately 55% increase in the 
treatment effect size relative to the RE model estimate. This new effect size is still 
negligible as d is less than a 0.2 (Cohen, 1988). Accordingly, when the synthesis 
includes information about the methodological quality of the studies there is no 





Figure 4. Forest plot depicting the quality effects model. 
Favours the intervention Favours the control 
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Identifying influential studies. The impact of disproportionately influential 
studies was assessed using a “leave-one-out” analysis. The figure showing the 
relevant forest plot can be seen in Appendix A along with a brief description of the 
results. Overall, no study exerted an excessive influence on the meta analytic 
treatment effect.    
Publication Bias and Small Study Effects 
The funnel plot of the correlation between the treatment effect and the 
standard error, and the results of Egger’s test (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 
1997) are shown in Appendix B. These tests reveal no evidence of substantial 
publication bias.  
Planned Subgroup Analysis. 
Studies were grouped by service context and distress construct for two 
















Non-specialised Specialised     Q p 
Service 
context 
SMD= -0.21,  
95% CI -0.5 to -0.04.  
Studies = 4 
Participants =510 
SMD= 0.05, 
 95% CI -0.15 to 0.26.  
Studies =10 
 Participants = 739 
n/a n/a n/a 3.91 0.04* 
 Anxiety Depression Hopelessness Self-esteem Trauma Q p 
Distress 
construct 
SMD= -0.21,  
95% CI -0.52 to 
0.10. 
Effect sizes = 4   
Participants = 217 
SMD= -0.03,  
95% CI -0.23 to 0.18.   
Effect sizes = 12   
Participants =725 
SMD= -0.43,  
95% CI -0.82 to -
0.04.   
Effect sizes = 2   
Participants = 113 
SMD= -0.22, 
 95% CI -





SMD= -0.13,  
95% CI -0.28 to 0.01.  





1. Service context. 
The reviewed studies can be broadly divided into specialised EIP services and 
non-specialised services. The specialised services were described to be aimed solely 
to work with service users experiencing first episode/early psychosis. As such they 
provided all participants in both control and intervention conditions with access to 
psychosocial interventions including cognitive behavioural techniques from care 
coordinators, family therapy and social groups as TAU. The non-specialised services 
were reported in the literature as either secondary care mental health services or out-
patient services. These provided TAU in the form of medication or medication plus 
traditional case management.  
As can be seen from the forest plot in Figure 5 and the data in Table 7 a small 
significant treatment effect on distress, favouring the intervention was seen in non-
specialised services. In specialised services no significant treatment effect was seen; 





2. Distress construct.  
The measures of distress used in the reviewed literature can be broken down 
into different psychological constructs of distress. As can be seen from the forest plot 
in Figure 6 and data in Table 7 only hopelessness was significantly impacted by the 
Figure 5. Forest plot depicting the subgroup analysis of service 
context 
    Note:  Morrison et al., (2018) and Madigan et al., (2013) studies 
were omitted as they were carried out in the mixed context of 
specialised and non-specialised services 
Favours the intervention Favours the control 
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intervention, above that of TAU. The effect size was small-moderate (SMD = -0.43) 
and the confidence intervals incorporate the grand meta analytic effect size. The 
subgroup analysis for hopelessness was only contributed to by two effect sizes. No 
other significant effects were found for specific psychological construct of distress.  
Three effect sizes were omitted from this subgroup analysis as the outcome 
measures reported do not measure a specific aspect of distress. Specifically, these 
were the GSI of the SCL90-R (Jackson, McGorry et al, 1998 b; 2005 b) and the 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS) (Kemp et al, 2007). As such they do not fit 
well the subgroup analysis.  
It should be noted that due to the variation in types of distress measured there 








Figure 6. Forest plot depicting the subgroup analysis of distress context. 
    Note:  Jackson, McGorry et al, 1998 b; Jackson, McGorry et al, 2005 b) and 
Kemp et al, 2007 effect sizes were omitted as they did not measure a specific 
aspect of distress.  




This review aimed to answer the question: Do cognitive behavioural 
approaches to first episode psychosis change an individual’s experience of distress 
beyond that of TAU?  
To answer this question the relative impact of cognitive behavioural 
approaches compared to TAU on self-report outcome measures of psychological 
distress was examined. Fourteen primary studies were identified which were 
designed and reported data in such a way that they could provide a useful 
contribution to answer this question.  
Main effect. The main effect analysis showed no significant effect of CB 
approaches on distress above that seen in TAU across the 14 studies. The trend, 
although very slight, was in favour of the intervention. The preponderance of poor-
quality studies have likely contributed to an underestimation of the treatment effect 
size in the literature. This can be seen in the application of the quality effects model 
to the data whereby, if all the studies were of a better quality (i.e. as good as the best 
study in the review) the effect size would increase by approximately 55%. Whilst this 
is interesting, and argues the need for future studies to be of better quality to 
accurately identify the magnitude of the treatment effect, the estimated effect size is 
still negligible (d=-0.14) and non-significant.  
This lack of significant main effect aligns with recent Cochrane reviews of CBT 
for schizophrenia. It seems CBT in the broader field of psychosis offers little 
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convincing benefit over standard care (Jones, Hacker, Xia et al., 2018). This may be 
due to a lack of true effect or to a lack of adequately designed, good quality research.  
Distress construct. The subgroup analysis of distress construct revealed that 
the intervention reduced hopelessness (as measured by the BHS) significantly more 
than TAU did. The effect size (-0.43) was at the high end of a to medium effect size, 
as interpreted by Cohen where 0.2=small, 0.5= medium and 0.8=large (Cohen, 
1998). The contributing effect sizes came from studies conducted in both specialised 
(Power et al., 2003) and non-specialised (Fowler et al., 2009) services which 
suggests this effect may be seen across service context. This effect seems to 
suggest that hopelessness is perhaps more responsive to CB approaches than other 
aspects of distress. However, it is important not to give too much weight to this 
finding as only two effect sizes contributed towards this. 
Service context. The subgroup analysis of service context revealed that CB 
approaches had a significantly greater impact on distress than TAU (SMD= -0.22; a 
small effect size), but only when provided in the context of non-specialised services. 
In the context of specialised services this effect disappears. In fact, such is the 
impact of specialised services that the remaining trend is reversed so that TAU 
seems to have a greater impact on distress than the intervention. It seems that the 
EIP services which provide care within a service model that was developed 
specifically to meet the needs of people within the critical developmental period of 
early psychosis has an impact on a person’s experience of distress that, in the 
current literature cannot be surpassed by adding therapy informed by cognitive 
behavioural approaches.  
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Limitations of the Literature  
There are a number of limitations to the existing literature which make it 
difficult to draw a firm conclusion. These are namely: problems with design, the 
definition of terms and the measurement of distress. 
 Design. The design of the studies is such that the absolute effectiveness of 
CB approaches in the FEP population cannot be addressed. It is likely that this 
question will not be able to be addressed without the significant ethical implications of 
preventing access to EIP services. This design difficulty is further compounded by 
the integration of cognitive behavioural principles such as graded exposure, thinking 
errors, thought challenging and activity scheduling into TAU in EIP services. This 
integration introduces contamination bias which makes even the question of 
effectiveness relative to TAU difficult to answer. 
A further difficulty is that the primary outcome of most of the included studies 
was symptom reduction. Consequently, the literature may underestimate the effect 
on distress as the studies may not have been designed to target, or be adequately 
powered for, the secondary outcome measures of distress (Andrade, 2015; Lincoln & 
Peters, 2019).  
 Definition of terms.  
Distress. Problems within the literature regarding the definition of distress 
presents a significant limitation, and the literature would benefit from more nuanced, 
better defined concept of distress that could be measured accordingly.  
Distress is a broad concept that describes overwhelming unpleasant 
emotional experiences alongside a perceived inability to cope with these experiences 
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(Ridner, 2004). Within the wider psychosis literature, the concept of distress is 
theorised to include distress caused by psychotic symptoms; such as voice related 
distress (Birchwood et al., 2014), paranoia distress and delusion distress (Lincoln 
and Peters, 2019). Additionally, distress experienced by individuals with psychosis 
may include anxiety, hopelessness, depression and other similar experiences 
(Bernard et al., 2015). This is perhaps unsurprising given that research suggests 
people who experience psychosis also experience a range of other mental health 
difficulties (Braga, Reynolds, & Siris, 2013; Upthegrove et al., 2010).  
The recognition that early psychosis represents a distinct and critical period 
(Reading & Birchwood, 2005) gives space for the hypothesis that the experience of 
distress within the early period of psychosis may be distinct with its own complexities. 
Complexities particular to early psychosis may come from: The novelty of the 
psychotic experiences and attempts to develop an explanatory narrative (Carter, 
Read, Pyle & Morrison, 2018); the psychological and social changes that occur 
during this early period of psychosis (Birchwood, Todd & Jackson, 1998); and the 
developmental changes during the adolescent period in which psychosis onsets. 
These developmental changes can in themselves can be distressing, and when 
disrupted by the onset of psychosis can be a further source of distress (Harrop & 
Trower, 2001).  
Distress within early psychosis therefore seems to be complex and 
multifactorial. This was captured by Griffiths et al. (2019) whose meta-synthesis 
emphasised the complexity of distress in early psychosis and identified that distress 
arises from a diverse range of factors and occurs across two broad domains of 
intrapersonal distress and interpersonal distress. Intrapersonal distress captured a 
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variety of internal experiences such as distress caused by psychotic symptoms, 
experiences of states such as depression and anxiety, problems resolving conflicts, 
difficulty maintaining a sense of identity, feeling unable to work towards valued goals 
and concerns about physical health. Interpersonal distress encompassed distress 
arising out of past traumatic and abusive experiences, personal relationships, contact 
with health professionals, and fears of stigmatization.  
It is evident that distress in early psychosis is a complex and multifaceted 
concept. The development of a robust definition that encompassed this complexity 
might allow for a clearer and more nuanced understanding of effectiveness in terms 
of distress reduction.  
Measurement and reporting of distress. Building on the difficulties identified 
with the definition of distress, the measurement and reporting of distress in this 
literature is problematic. There is currently no quantifiable method of measuring the 
interpersonal distress reported by Griffiths et al., (2019).  
Where quantifiable measures of distress are available these are limited to a 
few facets of intrapersonal distress and there is no consensus on which are used. 
For example, the BDI is used when CDS would provide a more psychometrically 
sound measure of depression. Other aspects of intrapersonal distress identified by 
Griffiths et al. (2019), such as difficulties maintaining a satisfactory sense of identity 
and feeling unable to work toward valued goals are not quantifiably represented 
within the literature.  
The style of reporting in the literature means that information is lost; the author 
came across no study where the distress scores of the PSYRATS were reported, or 
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where they could be calculated.  This poor measurement and reporting of the existing 
quantitative measures of distress is rectifiable. Its existence as a limitation may 
represent a delay in the shift from CBT as a “quasi-neuroleptic” to a process of 
supporting insight and relief from distress. 
First Episode Psychosis. As described in the introduction the literature 
struggles with an unclear definition of FEP. This is likely to result in variation within 
the population sampled. Such variation can be problematic as there may be 
meaningful differences within the participants who may respond differently to the 
intervention (Field, 2009) 
Whilst these limitations of design and definition of terms, particularly the 
definition of FEP, are important to acknowledge, they are reflective of clinical 
practice. Consequently, these could be considered to hold an intrinsic benefit as they 
capture the defining characteristics of current service provision. This ecological 
validity makes the review relevant to clinical practice.    
   
Limitations of the Review 
There are several limitations of this review that warrant consideration. Perhaps 
most notable is the resampling of participants in order to capture various elements of 
distress. This has resulted in the artificial inflation of sample size which can result in a 
problematic over-estimation of effect size (Moeyaert, Ugille, Beretvas, Ferron, Bunuan, 
& Van den Noortgate, 2017). However, resampling is necessary due to the use of 
multiple distress measures in primary studies which were not designed to assess the 
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impact on a specific aspect of distress. Abstaining from re-sampling would result in 
large amounts of data and participant experience being omitted from the review.  
The current review assessed changes in distress. However, due to the primary 
outcome of many studies being symptom reduction, and distress being a somewhat 
nebulously defined concept (as is described above) it was not possible to include 
distress as a meaningful search term. Consequently, the review may be limited as it 
relied on the judgement of the researcher to identify studies which met the criteria set 
out in the section titled systematic search method.  
Finally, the review did not consider process variables that might be expected 
to mediate the experience of distress, such as beliefs about voices (Chadwick, Lees 
& Birchwood, 2000). Such analyses may be helpful to identify aspects of therapy that 
have the most impact on distress and isolate therapeutic change mechanisms.  
Future research 
In light of the limitations described above, future research would benefit from 
design which targets distress as a primary outcome. Moreover, the distress scales of 
the PSYRATS should be reported and the CDS used in preference to less valid 
measures of depression such as the BDI. Furthermore, future research may benefit 
from considering the mechanism of change, in addition to distress as an outcome 
measure, as was done in the COMMAND trial (Birchwood et al., 2014). 
In line with Morison’s (2009) review of the effectiveness of CBT for FEP, the 
current meta-analysis recommends that future research may benefit from the 
consideration of therapies designed to target specific elements of distress. Such 
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elements of distress may include hopelessness, given the significant treatment effect 
that was seen in this meta-analysis.  
Perhaps, given the difficulties isolating CB intervention from TAU, the literature 
may benefit from development and acceptance of study designs other than RCT 
which may more comprehensively assess the effects of therapy in this population. 
RCTs are best used with symptom focused approaches for uncomplicated diagnoses 
(Shean, 2014) which neither talking therapies nor psychosis are. A marrying of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches within primary studies could provide a 
realistic alternative, such as the pragmatic RCT used by Fonagy et al. (2015) which 
utilised quantitative outcome measure, qualitative semi structured interviews and 
clinical components. Psychosis is known to be related to attachment difficulties, 
family dynamics and to impact markedly on identity (Gergel & Iacoponi, 2017; Korver‐
Nieberg, Berry, Meijer, & de Haan, 2014; Koutra, Vgontzas, Lionis, & Triliva, 2014). 
Therapeutic models with a stronger focus on the concept of self and relationships 
such as psychodynamic, systemic or existential therapies warrant further, thoughtful 
investigation and it is possible that a change in focus of the preferred research 
design may allow clearer evidence regarding effectiveness to emerge for both CB 
and other models of therapy above TAU.   
Clinical Implications 
Given the limitations of the literature and of this review some tentative clinical 
implications are proposed: 
• EIP services should continue to incorporate the CB model in its understanding 
and care of those with early psychosis. Services should not be led, under the 
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current climate of austerity and service pressure, to return to a more traditional 
service design where the CB model is left solely to the therapists.    
• Clinicians should consider carefully the nature of their clients’ distress to 
inform who is likely to benefit from a more formal CB based therapy.  It may be 
that those with high levels of hopelessness have the most to gain from CB 
based therapy in addition to treatment as usual in specialised EIP services. 
Conclusion 
This meta-analysis is the first to review the impact of CB approaches to 
therapy in the FEP population. The quality of the literature in this area is poor, as all 
included studies contained elements of unclear and high risk. Consequently, whilst 
there appears to be no significant impact of CB approaches on distress above that of 
TAU the literature does not allow for firm conclusions to be drawn. A key 
consideration of the literature is that the nature of specialised services for FEP make 
research into the absolute effectiveness of CB approaches in this population a 
difficult task. The literature is still relatively early in its shift away from CBT as a 
“quasi-neuroleptic”. This is reflected in the small number of studies using distress as 
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Making Sense of the Experience of Visual Hallucinations in Psychosis: An 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis.  
 
Abstract 
Introduction: The literature regarding visual hallucinations within the context of 
psychosis is sparse and our understanding of how individuals experience and make 
sense of visual hallucinatory experiences is lacking, especially when compared to 
the understanding of auditory hallucinations.  
Method: Interpretative phenomenological analysis was selected to provide the 
opportunity for a detailed ideographic understanding of participants’ experiences. 
Semi-structured interviews were completed with each participant, with support from 
their psychologist where needed. 
Participants: Six participants with experiences of visual hallucinations within the 
context of a schizophrenia spectrum diagnosis were recruited through psychologists 
in their care team. Participants were under the care of a range of services including 
Early Intervention, Community Teams, Assertive Outreach and Inpatient 
Rehabilitation.  
Analysis: Five superordinate themes were identified: ‘It’s not only a visual 
experience’, ‘Agency’, ‘Role of others, ‘Coming to know the experience’ and 
‘Creating a narrative’. Emotional experience was interwoven within each 
superordinate theme.  
Discussion: Links are drawn between the superordinate themes and existing 
literature regarding visual hallucinations, hallucinations in general and psychosis.  
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Clinical Implications: It was identified that the term “visual hallucinations” is a poor 
descriptor for the experiences participants described and therefore clinical work may 
be better focused on exploring the relationship between sensemaking and 
experience with psychosis more broadly, than on visual hallucinations in particular. 
The importance of listening and valuing an individual’s experience of visual 
hallucinations was emphasised and supporting individuals to engage with their 
experiences with the aim of psychological growth and recovery is recommended.  
Future research: A more detailed definition and phenomenologically grounded 
description of visual hallucinations is required to support the development of future 




Visual Hallucinations and Psychosis 
Psychosis is a term that transcends diagnostic categories, which have been 
criticised for being an arbitrary categorisation of distress (Wong, 2014). In this thesis 
the term psychosis is used interchangeably with schizophrenia to reflect the work of 
the authors cited and to provide clearer clinical implications. Precedent for this is 
seen by the British Psychological Society (BPS) who described persistent psychosis 
as synonymous with schizophrenia (BPS, 2000).  
Hallucinations have been defined as “a sensory perception that has the 
compelling sense of reality of a true perception, but that occurs without external 
stimulation of the relevant sensory organ” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, 
p. 767). Hallucinations can occur in any sensory modality; visual hallucinations are 
the second most commonly occurring modality (after auditory) and they affect around 
27% of those with schizophrenia (Waters et al., 2014). 
Phenomenological Understanding of Psychosis  
Phenomenological considerations of psychosis have a long history (Bürgy, 
2008). This section comprises a brief overview to provide context for 
phenomenological understandings of visual hallucinations.  
Laing (1960) emphasises the importance of entering the world of the person 
with psychosis and trusting that their experiences are meaningful. He theorised that 
psychosis is rooted in ontological insecurity (loss of a secure sense of being or 
existing), which in its less extreme form is proposed as common to all humans (van 
Deurzen, 1998). Spinelli (2001) hypothesised that this ontological insecurity could 
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promote meaningful reflection and facilitate resolution of persistent life problems. 
Alternatively, Spinelli (2001) also suggested that psychotic experiences such as fixed 
beliefs can provide a newfound ontological certainty, thus providing a sense of 
comfort for the person. 
Qualitative research has attempted to unpack the lived experience of 
psychosis. In a meta-synthesis, McCarthy-Jones et al. (2013) identified four 
overarching themes to the experience of psychosis: loss, identifying a need for and 
seeking help, rebuilding and re-forging life, and finally, better than new: gifts from 
psychosis. These themes were understood in the context of a sense of fear, 
confusion and hope. It is important to note that many of the reviewed studies lacked 
methodological rigour and none of the reviewed studies considered visual 
hallucinations specifically or explicitly. Therefore, it is impossible to know how much 
these themes describe the experience of individuals with visual hallucinations. 
Auditory hallucinations are better researched than visual and have been 
examined using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Some prominent 
findings are that there is a sense of enmeshment and a battle for power and control 
between the voice and the voice hearer (Chin, Hayward & Drinnan, 2009; Mawson, 
Berry, Murray & Hayward, 2011). The experience is reported to change over time, 
with the person developing an understanding of their voices, and the voices having a 
reciprocal relationship with emotional state (Milligan, McCarthy-Jones, Winthrop & 
Dudley, 2013). These studies provide a level of insight and understanding that is not 
yet present for visual hallucinations. 
Current Understanding of Visual Hallucinations  
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The content and features of visual hallucinations in psychosis are summarised 
in Waters et al’s. (2014) review to: be perceived as real and present; have the 
physical properties of real perceptions; include people, supernatural aspects, 
animals, objects and events; be brief; and to induce a varied emotional response 
from fear and hopelessness to happiness and reassurance. Within the broader field 
of mental health, it has been identified that visual hallucinations can be appraised in 
different ways and that negative appraisals are predictors of distress, regardless of 
the amount of perceived control a person might feel over their hallucinations 
(Gauntlett-Gilbert & Kuipers, 2005). 
Visual hallucinations as part of schizophrenia are associated with a greater 
level of distress, functional impairment, and a poorer prognosis compared to those 
who experience schizophrenia without visual hallucinations (Clark, Waters, Vatskalis 
& Jablensky, 2017; Oorschot, Lataster, Thewissen, Wichers & Myin-Germeys, 2012). 
Despite the prevalence and poorer associated outcomes, the study of visual 
hallucinations and their meaning to individuals is sparse, and consequently 
successful intervention is limited (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2013; Waters et al., 2014).  
There is a call for a greater understanding of hallucinations to improve interventions 
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2016), perhaps by “asking service users about their visual 
hallucination experiences to explore much more in-depth questions about their 
experiences, including what they see, [and] what leads to their distress” (Dudley, 
Collerton, Nicholson & Mosimann, 2013, p132). The current study aims to reduce the 
gap in the literature by moving towards an understanding of the experience and 
sense making of visual hallucinations. 
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Research Question  
To contribute to the embryonic literature in this area the current study will explore: 
How do people experience and make sense of visual hallucinations in psychosis? 
 
Method 
Design and Theoretical Rationale for IPA   
Qualitative approaches and IPA in particular are well suited to address the 
research question. The phenomenological aspect of IPA is concerned with exploring 
in detail an experience in its own terms rather than through the lens of a predefined 
concept. The interpretative aspect is concerned with layers of meaning of the 
ideographic experience and utilises the double hermeneutic with the “researcher 
making sense of the participant who is making sense of [their experience]” (Smith, 
Flowers & Larkin, 2009, p. 35) resulting in an iterative analysis of a person’s 
experience. These two aspects combined with the methodological rigour of IPA 
(Biggerstaff & Thompson, 2008) will allow a rich understanding of the complexity of 
the lived experience of visual hallucinations in schizophrenia from the individual’s 
perspective.   
  Reflexivity. Within the double hermeneutic, IPA recognises that the 
researcher’s presuppositions can hinder or enhance the interpretation of another’s 
lived experience. The following summaries the author’s position: 
Throughout the interviews I was working within an early intervention for 
psychosis (EIP) service. Previous work within EIP sparked my interest in psychosis 
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as an area in which psychiatric thinking was, I thought, overly-privileged above the 
psychological. My work in EIP gave me a better understanding of the often-debated 
idea that schizophrenia does not exist as an entity. My work with clients emphasised 
the importance of distress and the attempts of the psyche to function in, and 
understand, difficult or traumatic circumstances. My own epistemology and ontology 
are best described as critical realist where the existence of a reality is assumed but 
this reality cannot be known with certainty.  
Ethics and Sampling  
The research was approved and sponsored by the University of Birmingham, 
granted ethical approval by NHS ethics committee (IRAS: 228510, REC: 
18/WM/0089) (see Appendices A and B for approval letters) and was approved by 
the relevant Trust research department.  
Participants were recruited using purposive sampling to enable access to 
individuals with a particular experience (visual hallucinations) within a particular 
context (schizophrenia spectrum disorder). Participants who met the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria (see Table 1) were identified by their psychologist in their 






Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria  
Inclusion  Exclusion  Rationale  
Experience of visual 








A primary diagnosis of 
PTSD or bi-polar disorder. 
 
Hallucination induced by 
neurodegenerative 
disorders, optical disorders 
or substance abuse 
For ease of identification of 
participants by a 
multidisciplinary care team 
the diagnostic umbrella of 
schizophrenia spectrum was 
used. It was hoped that 
these diagnostic exclusion 
and inclusion categories 
would provide a 
homogenous group who 
have experienced visual 
hallucinations and therefore 
will have greater similarity of 
experience and sense 
making. 
Capacity to consent and 
over 18 years of age 
 This is necessary to provide 
a homogenous group with 
ability to consent 
autonomously. 
Ability to verbally 
communicate their 
experiences articulately. 
 This is necessary for the 
participants to be able to 
partake in the semi 
structured interview. 
 Requirement of the use of a 
translator to converse in 
English 
This is necessary as one of 
the key aspects of IPA is 
that the researcher makes 
interpretations of the 
participant’s report of their 
experience. The distancing 
of the researcher from the 
participant’s experience 
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through a translator will 
erode the validity of the 
method and any conclusions 




The procedure for the study is shown in Table 2:  
Table 2 
Study Procedure  
Stage Description 
1.Awareness of 
study raised for 
recruitment 
• Information about the study was disseminated to all 
relevant care teams within the trust via the researcher 
speaking at team meetings, meeting with relevant 
consultant psychiatrists and via email to all relevant 
psychologists within the Trust 
2.Identification of 
participants 
• Individuals who met the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
were identified by a member of their care team. For all 
participants this was their psychologist.  
• Participants were provided with a verbal summary of 
the research and a participant information leaflet (see 
Appendix D).  
• If the participant expressed interest in taking part in the 
study the clinician obtained their consent to pass contact 
details to the researcher 






• At the meeting consent was obtained from the 
participant (see Appendix E for consent form). 
• The interview was completed using the semi structured 
interview schedule and lasted for approximately one hour. 
• The interview was audio recorded 
5.Transcription and 
analysis 
• The interview was transcribed verbatim. 
• Interpretative phenomenological analysis completed 
 
Participants 
Seven participants were identified as suitable to participate. Six participants 
gave informed consent and took part in the research, one participant did not give 
informed consent and so did not participate. The six participants are summarised in 





Care Team  Diagnosis given  
Darren Assertive Outreach Team 
(AOT) 
Schizophrenia  
Jess Early Intervention for 
Psychosis (EIP) 
Schizophrenia 
Kathryn Inpatient rehabilitation 
Service (IPS) 
Schizophrenia 
Rashid Community Mental Health 
Team (CMHT) 
Schizo-affective disorder 




Sally Assertive Outreach Team 
(AOT) 
Schizophrenia  
Note: All participants were working directly with a psychologist.  
 John and Sally’s psychologist sat in on and took part in the interview. His speech in the 
transcript is identified as ‘Psych’ 
 
The demographics of participants are broadly summarised to maintain the 
participants anonymity. As can be seen in Table 3 five participants had a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, one had a diagnosis of schizo-affective disorder. Two participants 
identified as Asian- British, one as Mixed- Caribbean and White British, and three as 
White- British. Ages ranged from 37 years to 59 years old with a mean of 45 years 
old. Chronicity of mental health difficulties was requested from care coordinators, this 
was available for half of participants and was measured via number of years since 
first known contact with services, this ranged from 34 years to four years. All 
participants were working with a psychologist who identified them as eligible for the 
study.   
Interview schedule 
IPA utilises semi-structured interview to ensure key topics are covered whilst allowing 
exploration of idiosyncratic elements of the individual’s experience. The interview 
schedule was developed in collaboration with a service user consultant with 
experience of visual hallucinations in the context of schizophrenia (See Appendix C). 
 
Analytic Method 
Analysis followed the recommendations of Smith et al. (2009).  
Individual Level 
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After transcription, analysis was completed on each transcript in turn following 
the steps in Table 4. A reflective diary was kept noting the researcher’s thoughts and 
observations about the analysis to enable these to be bracketed (Smith et al., 2009).  
Table 4 
Steps of the Individual Transcript Analysis  
Step Name Details  
1 Reading  The transcript was read to allow the researcher to become 
familiar with the transcript and immerse themselves in the 
narrative  
 
2 Initial noting Initial noting of salient points of the participant’s experience on 




A close, detailed coding of the participant’s experience, their 
claims and concerns of this experience and their understanding 
of this experience. These codes were considered through the 
frame of descriptive, linguistic and conceptual codes (Smith et 
al., 2009). These codes were annotated onto text and the left-
hand side of the transcript using a different coloured pen to the 





Codes were reviewed and organised into clusters to form 
emergent themes in a separate document (see Appendix H for 
example). 
 
5 Themes and 
subthemes 
developed 
Emergent themes were grouped and organised into themes and 
subthemes according to principles of abstraction, subsumption, 
polarization, and contextual features (Smith et al., 2009) (see 
Appendix I for example) 
 
6 Early transcripts 
reviewed 
Transcripts 1-5 were reviewed in turn to identify any overlooked 




Superordinate themes across all participants were identified: Each 
participant’s themes were written on pieces of paper and arranged to form a new set 
of cross-participant superordinate themes with subthemes (see Appendix J). This 
final stage aims to reflect the key experiential claims and concerns across 
participants. 
Validity 
Triangulation was used to safeguard the validity of the analysis: The analysis was 
discussed and reviewed at regular supervision meetings and the researcher joined 
an IPA working group where the organisation of themes was reviewed. Although the 
researcher’s fore-structures were attempted to be bracketed it is likely the analysis 
would have different nuances if completed by a different researcher. As such it 





Five superordinate themes (SOTs) are presented. These are summarised with 
their subthemes and participant contribution in Table 5. (See Appendix K for table of 
cross-participant themes and quotes) 
Table 5 
Table of Themes Across all Participants 
Superordinate theme Subthemes 
Participants 
contributing 
1. It’s not only a 
visual experience  
1.1. It’s a complex and multifaceted 
experience   
All 
 1.2. It’s just like everything else, 
sometimes. 
Darren, John, Sally, 
Jess, Rashid 
2. Agency  2.1. Sense of agency  All 




 2.3. The role of agency in the sense of 
real-ness 
All 
3. Role of others 3.1. Shared experience or understanding  Jess, Kathryn, John 
 3.2. They can’t/won’t understand  All 
4. Coming to know 
the experience  
4.1.  Hard to make sense of: wrestling with 
reality  
Darren, Jess, Sally 
 4.2. Importance of reality  Kathryn, Rashid, 
John 
5. Creating a 
narrative 
5.1. Incorporating the experiences into pre-
existing ideas 
All 
 5.1.1. Spiritual side Kathryn, Darren, 
Jess 
 5.1.2. Link to previous trauma Jess, Sally, John 





1. It’s Not Only a Visual Experience 
This SOT captures the idea that the concept of visual hallucinations does not 
fully describe the participants’ experiences: they are more complex and occur across 
sensory and extra-sensory modalities. Furthermore, for Darren, John and Sally the 
term hallucination suggested a degree of difference to non-hallucinatory experiences 
that they did not relate to their experiences.  
1.1. It’s a complex and multifaceted experience. This theme featured 
strongly across all participants. Overall, participants described their experiences as 
complex and multifaceted occurring across three of the main sensory modalities 
namely: “seeing”, “hearing” and “felt”. The tactile experiences incorporated both 
temperature changes and an interaction between the hallucinatory experience and 
the person:  
It’s this: I was rushed into hospital, it started there like. The room went 
freezing cold and smoke came down outside  [Darren]  
And later:  
It sort of went in me a bit like. Y’know ‘cus I was swelled up and lying on 
the bed and it sort of went inside my head  [Darren]  
Here the hallucinatory experience interacted with Darren by crossing the physical 
boundary of his body and entering inside him. Darren also describes how he had the 
 5.2. Loop of experience 
and sense making 
All 
 5.3.  This new way of thinking about myself 
and the world has changed things 
All 
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visual experience of seeing his body swell up as a consequence of the interaction. At 
times these different sensory modalities were mixed-up together:  
it felt, it sounded (pause) well it didn’t sound it felt like some invisible 
hand around my throat  [Kathryn] 
Here Kathryn was asked to describe her visual hallucinations and her response 
suggests confusion or cross-over between the visual, auditory and tactile senses. 
This seems to demonstrate that the different sensory modalities are interlinked and 
difficult to tease apart.  
In addition to the different sensory aspects of the experience participants 
sometimes experienced seeing someone through an inference. John provides an 
example of this:  
J: The girl’s peeping through the fence, she must have been because 
that’s what they’ve been doing.  
Psych: did, did you see her?  
J: No I just heard her, but I presumed that she was at the back of the 
fence over there and see me sit down on the other side. So then just 
she said: ‘he’s there’, with great delight and it, her boyfriend said ‘where 
is he’.  He’s on the other end and I’m on the other side. I see them 
everyday.  [John] 
Here John initially describes seeing a girl, but then clarifies that he is presuming that 
she was there watching him because he heard her voice. It is not clear if this inferred 
seeing of “the girl” contributes to “them” he sees “everyday”.   
Further to the multi-sensory way of experiencing the hallucination, there 
seemed at times to be an inherent communicatory aspect to the experience: 
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D: I had three words going in my head, that it was actually telling me 
like. Authority, love and care. 
I: Authority, love and care?  
D: Of myself.   [Darren] 
In the above quote Darren describes that one feature of his hallucinatory experience 
was a direct communication, a transfer of three words “authority, love and care” from 
the hallucinated other straight to his own mind. Darren explains that implicit in these 
three words was an almost paternal instruction to take care of himself. Jess 
described a different way in which she received a communication:  
it [the cloud] formed a cross and I could see Jesus on this cross in the 
sky. I cried. Because I really thought I was seeing this: This is a calling 
for me.  [Jess] 
 
Here Jess infers that what she has seen must have some meaning; she interprets it 
as a communication in the form of a calling. The certainty she used when speaking of 
this communication: “This is” suggests a strong conviction that what she has seen is 
a communication. 
For some participants the complex way of experiencing their reality included a 
form of extra sensory perception:   
I’ve actually seen people, actually spirit people, and sensing and 
hearing things what aren’t there. 
I: Sensing things that aren’t there?  
D: Yeah. 
I: tell me a bit more about that?  
… 
D: I experienced a ghost just outside my ear, just outside my ear to the 
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back.  
I: and when you were hearing that, did you see anything?  
D: No, I was sensing things at the time  [Darren] 
Here Darren describes how he has sensed and experienced things. He explains that 
this is different to hearing and seeing when he corrects the interviewer’s question to 
emphasise that he was “sensing things” not hearing or seeing.  
 1.2. It’s just like everything else, sometimes. Participants’ descriptions of 
their experiences as complex, multifaceted phenomena described above in the 
subtheme 1.1 fits with a non-psychotic experience of the world: we do not just see a 
person, we feel their presence, hear their voice and have an idea of their internal 
world (i.e. their intention, emotions and thoughts). All whilst feeling the force of the 
environment on our own bodies: the feel of the seat of a chair, the temperature of the 
room, along with our internal bodily sensations (i.e. temperature changes, awareness 
of various bodily parts). To take away these elements would be to lose the richness 
and reality of the experience of existing. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that 
participants described their multifaceted experiences with a degree of normalcy that 
suggests that they’re all just experiences of the world. 
John described this by emphasising the normalcy of seeing and hearing the 
things he has been told are not real: 
J: Just like I’m with you now, I see you now I see these visions these 
people and hear these voices just the same.  
I: so they seem exactly the same they feel the same? 
J: (nodding) quite physical   [John] 
John underscores the physicality of hallucinatory experiences; he describes that they 
are indistinguishable from his other experiences. For John this way of experiencing 
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seems to be important for his sense making of the experiences as definitely real. In a 
similar vein Darren struggles to articulate what the experience is like, it seems this is 
because of the ordinary nature of them:  
 I don’t know I was just hearing things like. [Darren] 
Darren furthers this to explain that all his experiences of the world, including those 
that involve the “spiritual side” are just variations of the same category of thing, that is 
they are all “just experiences”: 
D: I’ve actually seen people, actually spirit people, and sensing and 
hearing things what aren’t there. 
… 
I: tell me a bit more about that?  
D: I don’t know. They’re just experiences while I’ve been in hospital.  
[Darren] 
The simplicity and ordinary nature of the experiences, and of how they are seen is 
captured in an exchange between the researcher and Sally: 
S: I was just getting some milk out the fridge because I was making a 
drink, and someone was standing behind the door dressed in black and 
with a black coat 
… 
I: Ok so you were sort of getting milk out the fridge and how did you 
notice the person in black? 
S: I just seen him.  [Sally] 
Here Sally seems to be explaining that there is no special process of seeing the 
figure. She uses “just” giving emphasis to the normality of the experience of sight, 
regardless of whether she is seeing things she has been told are hallucinations or 
not. 
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Alongside this ordinary-ness, participants described a contrasting sense of 
something odd about their experiences:  
I: I guess what I’m wondering is, you said that you feel things that 
weren’t there. How did you know that they weren’t there?  
D: Well there’s things about it, it sort of went in me a bit like. Y’know 
‘cus I was swelled up and lying on the bed and it sort of went inside my 
head.  [Darren] 
Here Darren describes how the experiences do not behave as he has come to 
expect the things within the world to behave. Sally describes a similar oddness about 
the perception:  
I: so you said that you see people with knives and chainsaws and is 
that something, do they feel or look as real as I do or is there something 
different about them?  
S: they’re not, they’re just like faint, I don’t really (trails off)  [Sally] 
This concurrent and contrasting experience of hallucinatory perceptions as both 
normal and odd was seen both within and across participants. 
This SOT summaries that the concept of a visual hallucination did not seem to 
capture the participants’ experiences very well. The experiences they described are 
more complex and confusing than the term suggests.  
2. Agency  
This SOT captures the experience of participants having a varying sense of 
agency over their hallucinatory experiences. Two main areas in which the role of 
agency seemed to feature in the experience of visual hallucinations is in the 
emotional experience and in the experience of ‘real-ness’  
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 2.1. Sense of agency. Across participants there was a variation in the amount 
of control over, or extent to which the participant played a role in the generation of 
their visual hallucinations. All participants at some points in their interview talked 
about their experiences as being external to the self with no sense of agency: 
I see him pass the door today, the one that was saying last night ‘where 
is he’.  [John] 
Here John talks about seeing a person, the implication being that the person was 
physically there to be seen and exists as separate entity to John with its own agency. 
In contrast to this, there were times when all participants (except John) moved 
towards describing their experiences as internally generated or had a sense of 
agency over them: 
Thinking that people are being killed, watching people be killed, actually 
seeing it with your eyes.  [Jess]  
In Jess’ extract there is a hint to the role of her mind in the experience when she says 
“thinking that people are being killed” which she then moves away from to emphasise 
the external nature of the experience and the reality of it: “actually seeing it with your 
eyes”.  A more explicit example of agency can be seen in Darren’s transcript: 
D: There was two veins sticking out where they operated like. When I 
was looking at that (gestures to surgical scar on his wrist) when I was in 
hospital it was like it was being cured like.  
I: Ok  
D: the healing of the wound like  
I: So what did you see?  
… 
D: I had a cut on my wrist from where the doctors had done the 
94 
operation and I was visualising that it had been cured. Like a 
hallucination towards the wound like.  [Darren] 
Here Darren use the terms “visualising” and “hallucination” to describe his 
experiences, suggesting that he is creating the visual experience. This type of 
language, specifically: “picturing”, “imagining”, “dreaming” and “hallucinating” was 
used by Rashid, Sally and Jess suggesting a sense of agency in the production of 
their experiences.   
Kathryn differed slightly in her use of agency. She didn’t express a feeling that 
she was producing them but that she played an active role in them and had control 
over them:  
I: do they come in the day time? 
K: When I communicate with spirit. When I meditate.  
I: So now it’s more of a errr, choice? 
K: Yes I’m in control.  [Kathryn] 
For Kathryn agency comes in the form of meditation which she uses to invite and 
allow her experiences.  
The mixed use of agency in the participants’ descriptions was not simply 
assigned to different experiences: Words denoting a sense of agency were used 
interchangeably with those descriptions suggesting no agency such as “it actually 
happened” and “I saw”. This is well demonstrated by Sally and Rashid: 
S: I just picture them there and just like ermm picture knives and things 
like that and I can see them cutting my throat at the back of me and 
stuff.  
I: so you said you can picture and you can see them. Is that two 
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different sorts of experiences or is it the same? 
S: the same  [Sally] 
 
R: I just see water, you know the sea. I imagine myself on a ship, a 
battle ship and a boat is going through the waves. I’m on the boat and 
then the water comes.  
I: and when you say you’re on the boat are you imagining that? 
R: No, I can see the boat, going through the water. I’m on a boat myself 
but I can see the other boat from where I am.  I never thought about 
seeing or imagining y’know I don’t know the difference.   [Rashid] 
 
In the above extracts Sally and Rashid explain that there isn’t a difference, or at least 
not a difference that they can glean between seeing and picturing/imaging. However, 
they show ambivalence over this as later in their transcripts. Sally distinguishes that 
the experiences she “pictures” are “[her]self” and are different to those hallucinations 
that are “actually here”. Similar to Sally, Rashid describes a difference between the 
two:   
R: Yeah, it’s when I’m looking at the ceiling. Y’know I just imagine, I 
wander off.  
I: So is it something that you see in your mind, like in your imagination 
or is it something that you see out in front of you?  
R: Both. Yes.  
I: and what’s the difference between those two? 
R: difference is, y’know in your imagination you can imagine just about 
anything. But then with the visionary hallucinations I want them to stop 
sometimes. When they get too strong, they get too violent, too violent, 
and with imagination, a lot I can imagine nice things and sometimes 
being in your mind on holiday, nice hot place.  
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I: But that’s not true of the hallucinations? 
R: No.   [Rashid] 
Rashid describes that like Sally he is generating the “imagination” experiences and 
that he can control their content and duration. However, unlike in his earlier extract 
he recognises a difference and describes that the opposite seems to be true of the 
experiences he is describing here as hallucinatory.  
The movement towards and away from the sense of agency, and the 
interchangeable language suggests that sense of agency is not experienced as a 
discrete distinction, instead it seems to be more of a continuum along which 
participants’ experiences and sense-making of their experiences varies.   
2.2. The role of agency in the emotional experience. When discussing her 
experience of “picturing” Sally describes that:  
S: when I was at home, I’d just be there thinking about my mum and 
just picture them and stuff.  
I: and do you see them here like you would see this chair or is it a bit 
different?  
S: Erm, bit different  
I: can you tell me how its different? 
S: doesn’t bother me, I just think it's myself sometimes so it doesn’t 
bother me.  
I: what do you mean, you think it’s yourself? 
S: probably that I’m imagining things myself  [Sally] 
Here Sally explains that experiences which have a strong sense of agency don’t 
“bother” her because they are internally generated, the implication being those that 
don’t have a strong sense of agency are experienced differently and do bother her. It 
is assumed that Sally uses “bother me” to describe an unpleasant emotional 
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experience.  Similarly, John, who does not experience a sense of agency over his 
experiences finds them completely terrifying:  
J: Just like I’m with you now, I see you now I see these visions, these 
people and hear these voices just the same.  
I: so they seem exactly the same the feel the same 
J: quite physical 
I: can you describe that to me, what that’s like? 
J: What that’s like, let me see. Traumatising. Disturbing. Upsetting. 
Nerve wrecking. Shocking. Nightmare. Horrific. Horrendous and the 
likes. Why don’t they leave me alone? They’re not giving up, they’re not 
letting it go, I know that much, I’ve heard them say that.  [John] 
It seems that in John’s case the intention to harm that he ascribes to the 
hallucinations, combined with the absence of a sense of agency make the 
experience of them particularly frightening. In contrast to this, Darren’s experiences 
with no sense of agency seem to bring a sense of being cared for: 
I: So tell me more about the spiritual feeling  
D: I dunno, it’s just the spiritual side like.  
I: What is, was there a particular quality about it?  
D: There was just a warm feeling in the room like. Sort of [pause] I had 
three words going in my head, that it was actually telling me like. 
Authority, love and care. 
I: Authority, love and care?  
D: of myself. Erm it was when I sort of thought I was experiencing God 
in the hospital. That’s how I explain it. [Darren] 
The extracts from Darren and John suggest that how the experience is understood 
seems to play an important part in the relationship between agency and emotional 
experience. For Darren spirituality may contribute to the positive emotional 
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experience while for John the intent to harm may contribute to the terror. This is 
explored in more detail in SOT five ‘Creating a narrative’.  
Kathryn’s sense of agency is slightly different, she does not describe that the 
experiences are internally generated but that she can influence them: 
K: I told this medium, an international medium what was happening to 
me and he said: ‘tell the spirit when they visit you at night that they’re 
disturbing my rest and that I will work with them in the day time’. And I 
did and I don’t get any spirit visitation at night now. 
I: OK that’s better, so you can rest now? 
K: Yes 
…. 
K: Yes I’m in control.  
I: How does that feel?  
K: Good  [Kathryn] 
Kathryn explains that the support of others has facilitated her gaining a sense of 
agency through control over the initiation of the experience. This provided her with a 
sense of relief and allowed her to better meet her fundamental need of sleep.  
2.3 The role of agency in the real-ness of the experience. There is a hint of 
a relationship between sense of agency and the feeling of real-ness an experience 
had, but again this is not simple: One might expect there to be an indirectly 
proportional relationship where a strong sense of agency equates to a weak feeling 
of real-ness. However, this does not seem to be the case. For Jess, the agency of 
interacting with a hallucination seems to make it more real:  
I remember sitting at the porch and the door, the front door being 
opened because I pushed it, the door was open and I pushed it ajar. Up 
until then my hallucinations were visual hallucinations, were only visual 
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I weren’t, I wasn’t interacting with them but this time I was.  
… But I know, I feel it was so real sitting on the porch step, the door 
was open, it was definitely open  [Jess] 
Here we see that for Jess the active role she takes to change the environment by 
pushing open a door that she describes as part of her hallucination makes the 
experience feel more real.  
However, Sally seems less concerned by experiences she has agency over, she 
discusses the difference between experiences with different senses of agency: 
S: I just think it’s myself sometimes so it doesn’t bother me.  
I: what do you mean, you think it’s yourself? 
S: probably that I’m imaging things myself and but the, when that, when 
someone was in the kitchen and tried to hit me in the face that wasn’t 
myself.  
I: that was different?  
S: that was different.  
I: what was different about that?  
S: because it was actually there.  [Sally] 
The experience she has no agency over “when someone was in the kitchen…that 
wasn’t myself” seems to be different and more real: it was “actually there”, than her 
experiences that seem internally generated. 
This SOT of agency summaries the continuum of sense of agency all 
participants experienced. The use of language like ‘picturing’ or ‘seeing’ was 
important in identifying where participants were at a given moment on that 
continuum. The sense of agency seems to relate in a complex way to the emotional 
experience and the felt sense of real-ness. 
3. Role of Others  
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Participants talked about other people in their lives, both professionals and 
non-professionals as contributing to how they understood their experiences, which in 
turn seemed to relate to the experiences they had. The role of others appeared to be 
experienced in two main ways: it either helped and felt positive to the participants or 
it felt negative: alienating and angering them.  
 3.1. Shared experience or understanding. Jess, Kathryn and John 
described positive aspects of sharing their experiences with other people that 
understood their experiences, or their understanding of their experiences. 
Considering Jess and Kathryn’s experiences:  
I: I guess I’m wondering, the people who haven’t had visual 
hallucinations, but have had other sorts of hallucinations. How did they 
respond to you? 
Jess: Alright, strangely. And that puts you at ease as well. But alright. 
[they] knew that I wasn’t talking y’know a load of bullshit. It was real. 
And they understand that. And that makes me feel better within myself.  
[Jess]   
 
K: I’m in an environment where I go to psychic meetings, I’m with other 
psychics who have had similar experiences to me and people who I can 
relate to.  
I: and what’s that like?  
K: It feels comforting. I feel errrm, right where I am. I feel great that I 
can actually talk about my experiences to people who have had similar 
experiences.  [Kathryn]  
In both examples we see that sharing experiences with others seems to contribute to: 
a validation of their experiences as real, feeling understood and gaining a sense of 
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calmness about their experiences. The importance of this is underlined by Jess later 
in her transcript when she says:  
I feel more normal when I come to drop in [informal social group within 
EIP] than I do anywhere else. 
This suggests that Jess otherwise lives with some degree of feeling abnormal.  
Another experience of helpful others is demonstrated by John who focuses on 
his care team, something other participants shared, and which Kathryn got from her 
psychic circle. Although John struggles to trust his team he does find that working 
with them gives him hope for his future:  
J: A clearer horizon, that’s what I’m hoping for.  A whole new horizon 
I: So that’s what you’re hoping for the future?  
J: Mmm that’s what I’m hoping to get out of the likes of this and 
cooperating with the team I’ve been in the service for a good 35 years 
and I’m a volunteer and I was helping. 
… 
Psych: So we have voluntary and involuntary patients here  
J: For the doctor to try and help me, and me to help myself.  [John] 
These moments of hope and kindred experiences punctuated the transcripts and 
provided relief from the struggles and more difficult emotions that were otherwise 
focused on, giving the impression that they provided a sense of grounding and 
psychological safety.  
 3.2. They can’t/won’t understand. In contrast to the previous subtheme, 
other people provided a source of pain and alienation, which was rooted in a general 
feeling that others couldn’t understand because they hadn’t lived through psychosis 
or, that they refused to attempt to understand the experience. All participants 
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articulated this experience to a greater or lesser degree.  An example of this is seen 
in Sally’s description of attempting to talk to her mother, which she generalises: 
S: I did tell my mum about it but she thought I was silly. Mmm. People 
think I was going crazy they didn’t, um they think that I’m pathetic 
probably and things like that. 
I: Ok, so quite, yeah negative things. Is that something they’ve said to 
you? 
S: (nods) 
I: yeah. Erm so it sounds like sharing what you’ve experienced has 
been, what, I don’t know quite hard maybe? 
S: I know deep down my mum and dad did care, but people around me 
didn’t. [Sally]  
Here Sally conveys a sense of being othered, dismissed as crazy and feeling that 
other people don’t care about her. In line with this, participants showed an awareness 
of the stigma associated with visual hallucinations which Jess describes:  
the look on people’s faces when you tell them that [you] hear and see 
things that they don’t hear and see, there’s a look of fear  [Jess] 
In the previous subtheme John identified his care team as a source of hope. But his 
ambivalence about his team is seen as he describes how his relationship with them 
is also framed by his sense of mistrust: 
J: I’m convinced they’re real and I’m thinking that the team work in 
collaboration and hoping I just to go along with it  
I: the team are in collaboration with? 
J: with the voices and the hallucinations because they’re not taking their 
time when they say it’s not real. 
… 
J: I’m seeing people, stalking me and plotting to harm me. Let’s see, I 
go to the team, explain to the team, the team say they don’t exist 
103 
they’re not real, only heaven exists. Mmmm? So where does that leave 
me?   [John]  
Here John describes how he sought help from his team but that he experienced them 
as not considering that his experiences were real, or at least real to him. This seems 
to push John closer to his explanation that people are out to harm him. Similarly, 
Kathryn describes that she experienced her team as unwilling to consider her 
explanation of her experiences as spiritual which seems to create distance between 
them and generate anger:  
K: Yes, yes. Now I know I’m dealing with professional people, but 
they’ve wrongly diagnosed me and they don’t know anything about the 
spiritualism. As far as they’re concerned it’s schizophrenia and it’s not.  
I: and that’s, it makes you very angry? 
K: It does yes, I’m dealing with ignorant people. People that don’t know 
anything about spiritualism.  [Kathryn] 
This SOT describes the importance of other people and their responses to 
participants’ experiences and sense making. The two subthemes reflect how these 
responses can be polarised and consequently seem to generate different emotional 
responses in the participants.  
4. Coming to Know the Experience  
It emerged across participants that they had been and were still working through a 
process of coming to know what was real and what wasn’t. The importance of this 
reality varied across participants. This process of coming to know seemed quite 
emotionally fraught and has strong links with the understanding participants 
developed which is discussed in SOT five “Creating a narrative”.  
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4.1. Hard to make sense of: wresting with reality. Talking about the visual 
experiences was marked by a wrestling back and forth about what was real and what 
wasn’t. This process of wrestling with reality was demonstrated by Jess:  
J : Now this must be a hallucination, because I can’t, because it was so 
real. I remember sitting at the porch and the door, the front door being 
opened because I pushed it, the door was open and I pushed it ajar… I 
could hear my nan and my dad saying ‘just shoot her, get rid of her, 
everything will be normal again’ I remember them saying that. I could 
hear them saying that. But I mean, I’m not in contact with them to be 
able to speak to them. But I know, I feel it was so real sitting on the 
porch step, the door was open, it was definitely open, but it couldn’t 
have been it must have been a hallucination. 
I: What makes you say it must have been a hallucination? 
J: Because, err, because, I don’t think they really had a gun. And, but I 
still don’t, it was so real, pushing that door that door was open and 
those voices I heard it. But now I know, well, well I don’t actually.  [Jess] 
Here Jess is engaging with a ‘wrestling’ process, giving us a taste of the confusion 
and anguish involved. This idea links with SOT two where agency has a relationship 
to real-ness and SOT one where visual hallucinations are not simply seen. The 
varied nature of the experience is as Jess would expect ‘reality’ to be, and her 
actions impact on this experience just as she would expect to happen in ‘reality’. She 
is pushed back and forth between viewing her experiences as real and not real.  
To try to ascertain what is real and what is not, Jess and Sally spoke about 
checking out their experiences with other people. At some points this seemed helpful 
to Jess and allowed her to settle on one side of her dilemma of reality which brought 
her some clarity and peace:  
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J: I thought people could see what I was seeing because it was that 
real.  
I: and when you say it was a bit weird, tell me about that 
J: Bit weird?  
I: Yeah  
J: Then you know you’ve got problems don’t you. So that’s what I 
meant by weird. That erm, coming to terms and accepting what I’m 
experiencing is a visual hallucination, that it’s not something that 
everybody’s seen.   [Jess] 
Here Jess explains that having spoken to her ex-partner’s sister she realised that she 
is not seeing what everyone else is seeing. Jess describes this knowledge as 
allowing her to accept her experiences as hallucinations.  
Both Jess and Sally seem closely tied to the idea that reality is a shared 
experience, as demonstrated above where Jess explains that seeing things that 
other people can’t see is “weird” and problematic. We can see that in Darren’s case a 
helpful idea to resolve this problem has been that the experiences are “real to [him]” 
D: I just looked behind me and he was gone like. He was there and 
then he wasn’t. I think I can see things but I don’t know if it’s my mind 
playing tricks or what.  
I: So did you have a question in your mind as to whether it was real or 
not?  
D: yeah, whether it’s real.  
I: Can you tell me a bit more about that questioning?  
D: [My psychologist] said it feels real to me like so, it must be 
happening. It’s real to me, like I say 
I: And at the time did you have a question, a wondering if it was real or 
not?  
D: erm. No, it was what I saw and feel. It was real to me what happened   
[Darren] 
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This idea of his reality seems to allow Darren to hold two seemingly conflicting ideas 
that what happened was both real and the possibility that it wasn’t real whilst 
acknowledging the importance of the feeling of reality.  
4.2. The importance of reality. The question of whether it is important that 
experiences are real or not varied across participants. John and Kathryn made it 
clear that it was very important that their experiences were real, and it seemed 
important for them to communicate this in their interviews. Kathryn started the 
interview by making it clear her experiences are not hallucinations but are very real 
spiritual experiences: 
I: First off I guess I want to ask, have you experienced what people 
might term visual hallucinations? 
K: They’re not hallucinations they’re visions.  
I: They’re visions OK.  
K: erm, I’ve had premonitions, visions and I’ve had spirit visitations. I’m 
a psychic.  
I: And visions is what you prefer to call them?  
K: Yes 
I: Ok, that’s good to know because people have different ways they like 
to talk about it.  
K: Spiritualism has been around for donkeys’ years. And if you haven’t 
had experience of spiritualism you’re a bit kind of ignorant to the fact 
that spirit communication with actual spirits is what I’ve been doing.  
[Kathryn] 
This extract demonstrates that Kathryn seems to have found it undermining for her 
experiences to be classed as hallucinations. Similarly, John seemed to find it 
insulting to not be taken at his word that his experiences were real:  
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I know what’s there. I’m not daft, I might be daft but I’m not stupid. It’s 
not a dream.  [John] 
At the other end of the spectrum was Rashid who addressed the question of 
importance of reality with some ambivalence. On the one hand it seems very 
important that the question of reality is unimportant to him:  
I: and has that [professionals’ explanation of his experiences as visual 
hallucinations] changed your understanding of what you see? 
R: not really no, because I think I’d always get them I think. There’s no 
way I’d ever stop them. No way. Never stop them. So I don’t want it to 
have a big impact on me, so that’s why I don’t make a great deal out of 
it. I don’t really wanna act on them. I think so long as they’re managed 
or you’re in control of them then it’s not too bad.  [Rashid]  
It seems that for him knowing that they aren’t real makes no difference as to whether 
they continue to occur. Instead his focus is on his response to the experiences which 
he views as unrelated to the question of reality. On the other hand, Rashid 
demonstrates ambivalence over reality: 
I don’t want to believe they’re real, see. I don’t think, no I’ve never 
thought they’re real… because y’know if I start believing that they’re 
real then I’d really think to myself that I’m not y’know like sane. I’d think 
that I’m mentally unwell  [Rashid] 
Followed later by:  
They were just like people, they felt real. It wasn’t like it was a picture or 
a video on a screen. It was like y’know reality. Real.  [Rashid] 
Here Rashid seems to suggest the question of reality is in fact important to him and 
to how he views himself. It seems that his denial of the importance of reality is rooted 
in a fear that it will mean he is “mentally unwell” and the ambivalence over whether 
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his experiences are ‘real’ or not seems to be associated with a fear of being labelled 
as “mentally unwell”.  
The remaining three participants: Sally, Jess and Darren, as discussed in 
subtheme 4.1, do wrestle with what is reality and what is not reality. However, they 
did not focus so explicitly on this in their interview, suggesting that whilst it is 
important to them, it is perhaps less important to them to communicate their position 
to other people.  
This SOT reflects an ongoing process of participants knowing their experience. The 
process of struggling with understanding what it means for an experience to be real, 
how one can ascertain that, and whether or not reality is an important aspect to be 
concerned with has been described, and variation across participants acknowledged.  
5. Creating a Narrative   
Across all participants there was a theme of creating a narrative to explain 
their experiences. Multiple narratives were considered, and these are described in 
turn. The relationship of participants’ explanations of their experiences to the 
experiences themselves is considered.  
5.1. Incorporating the experiences into pre-existing ideas. All participants 
seemed to use knowledge or experience they already had to make sense of their 
hallucinatory experiences. This fell into three main categories: a spiritual explanation, 
a link to previous trauma and a medical/biological explanation. The ideas of 
spirituality and medical/biological are ones that existed within the participants’ 
culture, while the link to previous trauma is a link to previous experiences rather than 
knowledge.  
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  5.1.1. The spiritual side. The idea of a spiritual side to life is largely 
culturally acceptable, as is evidenced in the existence of religion, spirituality and 
psychics. Spirituality or religion was important to Darren, Jess and Kathryn:  
D: well it sort of tells you there’s something there anyway. I mean I 
hadn’t believed in anything like that but it shows you that there’s 
something there 
I: when you say that there’s something there, what do you mean by 
that? 
D: Well it’s a spiritual side, I’ve experienced ghosts and stuff y’know it’s 
like there, after death or something. Y’know it’s real.   [Darren] 
Here Darren acknowledges that he was aware of the concept of a spiritual side. 
However, for him it was only when he experiences his visual hallucinations that he 
recognises the existence of it. Kathryn relates her experiences to this spiritual side in 
a similar way, although she holds more strongly to this explanation and it becomes a 
part of her identity:  
I’ve had premonitions, visions and I’ve had spirit visitations. I’m a 
psychic.  [Kathryn]  
Both Darren and Kathryn have lost close family members, which they link to their 
explanation of the existence of a spiritual side: 
I don’t know, I don’t really why it was happening anyway. I think it’s all 
to do with my mum dying and stuff, my mum and brother. I mean it 
happens on her birthday two years after she died.  [Darren] 
Whilst Darren and Kathryn make a link between their bereavements and their 
experiences neither of them explicitly offers an explanation of how or why they are 
linked. However, it seems that a sense connection to their deceased family may play 
a role:  
110 
I: what about your parents?  
K: They died, they’re both dead. Passed over.  
I: and do they communicate with you at all?  
K: My father does.  
I: And what’s that like? 
K: It’s very emotional, I mean if your parents communicated with you 
you’d feel emotional. I miss him, I love him, y’know.  [Kathryn] 
Here Kathryn describes how her experiences give her an ongoing connection with 
her father. This link between bereavements and a spiritual explanation may explain 
the importance of this explanation.  
The religious aspect of spirituality is more relevant to Jess: 
I could see it … and I remember thinking maybe, maybe this is a calling 
… I questioned all of my beliefs and what, y’know I’m seeing Jesus 
Christ on a cross here! What the, what is it time for me to change or is it 
a sign for me   [Jess] 
Jess had a pre-existing knowledge of a variety of religions and was brought up 
Buddhist. Jess’ faith and understanding of religions is something she described as 
helpful and that gave her “strength”.  
  5.1.2. Link to previous trauma. The explanation of the visual 
experiences linking to previous traumatic experiences was explicit in Jess and Sally’s 
interviews:   
 I had, I’d gone to the police station to report [a family member], he 
errm. He errm he sexually abused me … And the auditory 
hallucinations and the visual hallucinations were all based around the 
fact that I’d gone to the police. That there were people that didn’t 
believe me, that thought I’d ruined their lives by going to the police and 




Psych: before the voices and that, and do you make a link between that 
the experiences with these girls that were kind of bullying or, because I 
just know that you’ve had some quite difficult or traumatic experiences 
with, erm, do you think that they are related to the voices in anyway? 
S: (nods) 
I: how do you think they were related  
S: I think they used to know each other.  
I: so you think the voices used to know these girls?  
S: (nods) 
I: and what about the people that you see? did they used to know the 
girls as well or? 
S: (nods)  [Sally] 
Here Jess and Sally explain their experiences using links to previous trauma. For 
Jess this explanation seemed more of an acknowledgement of the psychological 
impact of her trauma whereas Sally made a direct link that the people she sees now 
knew the people who previously traumatically bullied her.  
John repeated that his “face doesn’t fit” and that the people he sees are intent on 
harming him. John does not explicitly link this to any events in his life, but his 
psychologist did explain that John had been the victim of racial attacks. It seems that 
John may have interpreted his visual hallucinations as threatening because of his 
previous experiences of being assaulted due to his race.  
  5.1.3. Medical/biological explanation. This medical/biological 
explanation is widely asserted in the participants’ culture and seems to have been 
emphasised through their contact with medical professionals:  
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D: [My psychologist] said it was because I wasn’t well at the time which 
is probably right yeah.  
I: It was because you weren’t well at the time?  
D: I probably wasn’t well at the time.  [Darren] 
Here we can see that Darren considers the explanation but maintains some distance 
from it through his use of the word “probably”. Jess considers an explanation of some 
kind of biological problem in her brain, which she described as predating her contact 
with services:  
I knew that something was going on in my brain, I just didn’t know what. 
I could hear and see things that other people weren’t hearing and 
seeing. [Jess] 
Here Jess explains something that is also featured in Rashid’s interview; that the 
hallucinatory experiences are abnormal and are a manifestation of a physical 
problem with the health of the brain or mind.  
Across participants there was variation in their conviction in the explanations. 
It seems that for some only one explanation can be considered and is held on to 
tightly (Kathryn, Rashid, Sally and John) whereas Darren and Jess seem to tolerate 
and move between different explanations.  
5.2. The loop of experience and sense making. There was evidence across 
all participants that their experiences (during psychosis or prior to it) were used to 
help make sense of their visual hallucinations, and that this understanding of the 
hallucinatory experiences then seems to have a relationship with their subsequent 
experiences. It is not clear at what point in the cycle this process starts, but it seems 
evident that experience and sense making were relating to each other as if in a loop.  
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The different explanations considered in the subtheme above (5.1) tended to have 
different relationships with the hallucinatory experience.  Darren provides a good 
example of the relationship between sensemaking and experience:  
D: I was sensing things at the time, that was while I was in (old asylum), 
my mum and brother had died [pause] 
…  
I: OK, and you were sensing and feeling things?  
Darren: It’s this: I was rushed into hospital, it started there like. The 
room went freezing cold and smoke came down outside, I felt like a 
ghost in the room  [Darren] 
Here we see that Darren’s spiritual explanation of his experiences seems to be 
associated with him identifying changes in temperature and seeing smoke as being a 
ghost. For Kathryn, Darren and Jess the experiences that they explained as spiritual 
tended to be made sense of as more benevolent, especially for Kathryn and Darren:  
K: they’re my guides and they make sure that I’m safe and I ground 
myself and I talk to spirit.  
I: and they’re quite positive then? 
K: yes they are yes.  [Kathryn] 
When reflecting on how difficult his experiences have been Darren explains that 
despite it all, he has experienced them as a good thing. He seems to suggest that it 
is the spiritual nature of this experience that makes it good:  
probably It’s a good thing though, got to be, it’s got to be spiritual.  
[Darren] 
For Jess, Sally and John, the understanding of their experiences as a result of 
trauma seems to leave them interpreting the presence of visual hallucinations as 
threatening:  
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J: They’re quite normal people, quite normal individuals  
Psych: so so you’re not able to differentiate whether they are like a 
visual hallucination or an actual person is that right? 
J: I know it’s an actual person  
Psych: you know 
J: I’m convinced  
Psych: Yeah but you know that they want to harm you, you believe that 
they want to harm you 
J: Indeed, indeed, indeed.  [John] 
Here we see an exchange between John and his psychologist. John explains that 
there is nothing different between what he has been told are hallucinations and all 
the “normal people” he sees. His psychologist clarifies with John that he can tell the 
difference, because of the visual hallucination’s intention to harm him, which John 
strongly confirms “Indeed, indeed, indeed”. 
Similarly, Sally describes that she experiences the people she sees as threatening, 
most likely due to her sense making that they know her previous bullies: 
S: Its like as if, someone’s got a grudge against me or something and 
I’ve not, I’ve done, I haven’t hurt no one. I know I haven’t.  
I: but you feel like someone must have a grudge against you, what 
makes you say that? 
S: Erm, I don’t know, because, they [visual hallucinations] think like 
because I’m a good person and that they take the piss and thinking 
that, erm they think that they can do anything they like to me and stuff.”  
[Sally] 
 
Jess explains explicitly that how a person understands the experience of 
visual hallucinations is important: 
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J: it [visual hallucinations] could be quite dangerous.  
I: quite dangerous?  
Jess: Yeah, yeah I think so.  
I: dangerous in what way? 
J: How you interpret your hallucinations. Or if you’re even able to tell 
that you’re having a hallucination, because at first I didn’t know they 
were hallucinations. [Jess] 
Here Jess explains that the sense made of a hallucinatory experience can make it 
dangerous and scary, particularly when they are experienced as real. She later 
elaborates on one of the ways she experienced this danger: 
J: The hallucination at the time, it was, I remember seeing my brother 
walking towards my flat because he wanted to speak to me because of 
what I’d done, because I’d gone to the police station and because he’d 
come into contact with me that’s why he was shot. That’s what I thought 
was going on, in my brain. Seeing my brother shot. And then shortly 
after that I erm I think I went a bit crazy actually after that.  
I: Do you remember what happened?  
J: I ran out into the street, without any shoes on erm, I thought that, the 
message that, what I was experiencing at the time was telling me that I 
had to martyr myself in order to save the rest of family because they too 
would be affected and maybe killed. So I ran in front of a lorry. Because 
I thought that was going to be able to save everyone. [Jess] 
Here Jess demonstrates the loop of experience and sense making: the visual 
hallucination she saw of her brother being shot and which she experienced as scary 
was made sense of as being a consequence of her actions linked to her previous 
trauma: 
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 because of what I’d done, because I’d gone to the police station and 
because he’d come into contact with me that’s why he was shot. That’s 
what I thought was going on  
Following this sense making, Jess then experienced her hallucination as giving her a 
message: 
the message that, what I was experiencing at the time was telling me 
that I had to martyr myself in order to save the rest of family 
Within which the sensemaking seems to suggest that because of her previous 
understanding that she had been the cause of her brother being harmed, she had to 
resolve this threat to her family by killing herself to save them.  
This loop of sense making and experience is not limited to just the visual 
hallucinations. John articulates that his experience of the people he sees is:  
J: Traumatising. Disturbing. Upsetting. Nerve wrecking. Shocking. 
Nightmare. Horrific. Horrendous and the likes. Why don’t they leave me 
alone?   [John] 
This scary experience and his sense making that they intend to harm him seems to 
colour all John’s experiences in his life with mistrust:  
J: I ask her am I in trouble? The lady [CPN] turn round and tell me no. 
Now that’s a weight off my shoulders. 
I: so you thought you might have been in trouble? 
J: Indeed, big trouble.  [John] 
Including fearing getting in trouble with his care team, or fearing they are 
collaborating with the people he sees. 
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5.3. This new way of thinking about myself and the world has changed 
things. Participants explained that their experiences have altered their 
understanding of themselves and of the world. Darren explains: 
I’ve heard people have had visits of spirits, when they’ve lost members 
of their family y’know. And I wouldn’t believe them if it didn’t happen to 
me like. It’s changed my perspective of things anyway.  [Darren] 
Darren is describing how his experiences have made him more open minded and 
have altered his perspective of life and what is available to be experienced. Jess 
explains that the way she sees the world has changed and that she has become a 
kinder and more open-minded person because of her experiences: 
J: strangely despite everything that’s happened I’m actually a better 
person now.  
I: Better how, in what way?  
J: The way that I look at things, the way that I perceive things. I try and 
be a nicer person now towards people.  [Jess] 
Kathryn also described that her experiences have “opened me up to the spirit world” 
and are enriching her life: 
I: imagine, you’d not had these experiences, you’d not seen the visons 
how would your life be different? 
K: well it would just be boring to be quite honest. I’d just be plodding 
along getting through various experiences. This is going to change my 
life.  [Kathryn]  
However, there was a split in the participants with Rashid, John and Sally describing 
their experiences with a sense of loss: 
R: And I think these thoughts the hallucinations they, in my experience 
they make me very negative. You know before was positive. You know 
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the positive and the love and the affection towards people is replaced 
by negativity, anger, hatred.  
I: so its changed the way you feel about other people?  
R: and life, life in general, and you know society, the world  [Rashid] 
Here Rashid describes how his experiences have robbed him of joy and made him 
view the world in a negative way.  
Sally and John similarly describe that: 
I was pinned to the sofa (with fear) … and I’ve never been right since.  
[John] 
 
I: is there anything that we’ve not talked about that you feel is 
important? 
S: No I think you’ve asked lots about what I’ve seen, I think it’s really 
important because I just want it all to stop really. I mean what has 
happened and that, its like as if (voice starts to break) my whole life has 
been taken away (deep breath)   [Sally]   
The loss in Sally’s and John’s extract is palpable and their experience of visual 
hallucinations has had a detrimental effect on their lives. It seems that their sense 
making through the lens of previous trauma has been key to how they experienced 
their visual hallucinations.  
This SOT summarises participants’ process of understanding their 
experiences and the relationship of this understanding to the experience itself, and to 





This study aimed to understand how visual hallucinations are experienced and 
made sense of in the context of psychosis. Five SOTs were presented encompassing 
the nature of the experience as not just visual, that there is a varied sense of agency 
in the experience, a questioning of the reality as participants engage with a process 
of trying to know more about their experiences and finally creating a narrative 
whereby participants engaged in a process of trying to explain and understand their 
experiences.  
It’s Not Only a Visual Experience 
This superordinate theme suggests that the term ‘visual’ hallucinations is an 
oversimplification of a complex and multi-faceted experience and may lose essential 
aspects of the experience. The false distinction between modalities may make it 
difficult to gather prevalence rates or make meaningful inferences about prognosis. 
Clinically this underlines the importance of hearing the participant’s experience, in its 
own terms rather then through the context of psychiatric terminology.  
Existing literature suggests that the experience of hallucinations as usual 
perceptions is early in the developmental process and occurs prior to an explanatory 
model being formed (Carter, Read, Pyle & Morrison, 2018). However, the findings of 
the current study do not wholly support this view as participants described generating 
explanatory models for their experiences prior to contact with services and 
experiencing hallucinations as usual perceptions concurrently with noticing odd 
things about them, throughout their experience of psychosis.  
Role of Others 
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This SOT emphasised the importance of feeling heard and understood and 
the impact this can have on self-esteem, particularly when sharing experiences with 
other individuals who have experience of psychosis, as has previously been 
identified (Perry, Taylor, & Shaw, 2007). This is likely to be particularly important 
given the reduced social networks and support observed with psychosis (Gayer-
Anderson, & Morgan, 2013). The response of both family/friends and professionals 
was at times experienced by participants as a refusal or inability to understand. This 
resonates with literature linking stigma from others to lowered self-esteem and an 
ongoing struggle for acceptance (Knight, Wykes & Hayward, 2003) 
The response of professionals seems to link to the medical/biological 
explanation, especially for Kathryn. Existing literature links this explanation to 
stigmatization (Read, Haslam, Sayce & Davies, 2006) which can impede recovery 
(Beresford, Nettle & Perring, 2010). Furthermore, the explanation and responses of a 
clinician can play an important role in the client’s development of their beliefs (Carter 
et al., 2018) which emphasises the need for a considered response from 
professionals. 
Agency  
Movement along the continuum of sense of agency over experiences may link 
to the sense of enmeshment and jostling for power that is reported in voice hearing 
(Chin et al., 2009; Mawson et al., 2011) and to the loss of sense of self in psychosis 
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2013). This dissipated sense of self may explain why 
hallucinations were at times perceived as being both externally or internally 
generated, or experienced with varying degrees of control: If the sense of self has 
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dissipated the boundary of the self is no longer clear, and it is hard to identify where 
phenomena are generated. As such the self may encompass stimuli within the 
environment typically seen to be outside of the self; perhaps such as the door in 
Jess’ hallucination. Alternatively, the self could exclude stimuli that the mind has 
generated such as one’s own thoughts, as may be possible in the case of Darren 
who described three words “authority, love and care” being implanted to his mind by 
God. This exclusion fits with evidence that hallucinations may be a result of an 
externalising bias in the misattribution of cognitive events (Brookwell, Bentall & 
Varese, 2013).   
The theme of sense of agency had a varying relationship with the emotional 
experience and the sense of real-ness of the experience, irrespective of where the 
hallucinatory experience was perceived to be generated. Furthermore, it was seen 
that control or interaction with the experience could strengthen the sense of reality.  
This finding can be considered in cognitive terms through the ideas of Trower and 
Chadwick (1995) who suggested that the self is continuously constructed and never 
secure: The self is proposed as made up of the subjective self (which has the power 
of agency and awareness of self), and the objective self (the self presented in 
relation to another person) which is reified by awareness from the subjective self 
(Chadwick, Birchwood & Trower, 1996). As such, the sense of agency and its 
relationship to felt sense of reality and emotional experience that participants 
described may be linked to varying degrees of strength or weakness in this 
subjective self and could originate in the disruptions of typical adolescent 
developments of the self and agency that is seen in schizophrenia (Harrop & Trower, 
2001). 
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Creating a Narrative  
To understand their experiences participants linked their experiences to their 
frames of reference. Although these explanations were characterised by some jumps 
of logic, they did not seem to be wholly unreasonable. Indeed, the link to previous 
trauma fits well with established literature regarding the association of hallucinations 
with traumatic life events (Bentall, Wickham, Shevlin & Varese, 2012; Janssen et al., 
2004). The findings concur with Bentall et al.’s (2012) results that childhood sexual 
abuse is a predictor of visual-auditory hallucinations and that the experience of being 
victimised is a predictor of paranoia and visual-auditory hallucinations. However, the 
current study furthers the model proposed by Bentall et al. (2012) by providing a 
phenomenological understanding of this association, particularly through the loop of 
experience and understanding. This loop, whereby previous life experiences colour 
how a person encounters and makes sense of experiences, which then impacts on 
subsequent experiences, goes beyond existing literature that suggests that differing 
appraisals of visual hallucinations are made and that these appraisal impact on 
distress (Gauntlett-Gilbert & Kuipers, 2005). The loop suggests an explanation for 
how the appraisals might be generated, how distress might be maintained and how 
these appraisals might affect the generation of hallucinations and the experience of 
the world.   
Coming to Know the Experience  
SOT five: ‘Creating a Narrative’ links with SOT four: ‘Coming to Know the 
Experience’ which was characterised by a difficult and fraught process of trying to 
understand what it means for an experience to be real. Within the subtheme 4.1 of 
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wrestling with reality, the idea that reality is a shared experience was identified; this 
concurs with McCarthy‐Jones et al.’s (2013) theme that psychosis is characterised by 
a loss of consensual reality.  
It seems that what the participants think about their experiences (how they 
experience and make sense of them) becomes their reality and forms ‘The loop of 
experience and sense making’ (subtheme 5.2). This fits with the idea that reality 
“mean[s] something approximate to ‘what is thought about things in general’… rather 
than ‘how things really are when thought is removed’” (Larkin, Watts & Clifton, 2006, 
p105). As such, the wrestling of trying to distinguish between the reality of their 
thoughts and cognitive experiences, and the reality of their experience of physical 
objects in the world is a difficult and perhaps impossible task.  
The participants’ ontology and epistemology seemed changed, or at least 
shaken by their experiences. Given these ontological and epistemological changes it 
is perhaps unsurprising that participants’ views of the world are altered. For some this 
loss of the security of the self in the world was an opportunity for meaningful personal 
growth, for others this was terrifying, and for others still it gave newfound certainty 
and meaning. This fits well with existing phenomenological understandings (Laing, 
1967; Spinelli, 2001) and has some links to the overarching themes of loss, 
rebuilding and re-forging life, and gifts from psychosis identified in McCarthy-Jones et 
al., (2013) meta synthesis on psychosis.  
Strengths and Limitations  
IPA methodology. The criteria for good quality, valid IPA described by Smith 
(2011) and Yardley (2000, 2008) are set out in Table 6.  
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Table 6 
Criteria for good IPA 
Smith (2011) Yardley (2000, 2008) 
Subscribes to the theoretical principles of 
IPA: is Phenomenological, Hermeneutic and 
idiographic 
Sensitivity to context 
 
Transparent Transparency and coherence  
Coherent, plausible and interesting analysis Impact and importance 
Sufficient sampling Commitment and rigour 
 
This study subscribes with commitment, rigour and transparency to the 
theoretical principles of IPA: The interview schedule was created from a 
phenomenological position to capture ideographic experience with the help of an 
expert by experience to promote sensitivity to context; Analysis was completed 
participant by participant to allow ideographic meaning to emerge (see Appendices 
F-I); The author’s context and fore-structures are acknowledged; and the double 
hermeneutic can be seen in the analysis. Sufficient sampling of n=6 was reached 
(Smith et al., 2009) and at least three participants contributed to each theme (Smith, 
2011). Triangulation through supervision and working groups strengthen the validity 
of the themes. The analysis links with existing psychosis literature both 
phenomenological and otherwise, suggesting that it is a plausible analysis. Given the 
scant literature on the subject it is hoped this study provides an important 
contribution.  
Sample characteristics. Participants were sampled from a range of care 
teams spanning from EIP, to CMHT, AOT and IPS. This broad range allows a view of 
the experience across different levels of need. Two participants (John and Sally) 
125 
requested that their psychologist was present in their interviews, and whilst present, 
he also contributed to the interviews. The presence of the psychologist enabled these 
participants to take part in the interviews and have their experiences heard. However, 
it may have introduced issues of power dynamics to the interviews. Two of these 
power dynamics are: Firstly, the balance of professionals to service users was 
uneven with the service user outnumbered two to one. Furthermore, the participants 
would be aware that in AOT their liberty and the type of care they receive depends 
upon how mentally well they are. This context combined with the presence of their 
psychologist may have resulted in participants feeling somewhat disempowered, 
unable to speak freely or share all of their experiences.  
A second power dynamic is that although the researcher (the trainee clinical 
psychologist completing their first IPA study) remained the lead interviewer and all 
questions on the interview schedule were addressed a sense of being observed and 
appraised by the qualified psychologist was felt by the researcher. This power 
dynamic may have influenced both the researcher and the qualified psychologist. It is 
possible that this dynamic facilitated the qualified psychologist to actively participate 
in the interviews whilst simultaneously impeding the researcher from asking the 
qualified psychologist to refrain from participating in the interviews.  This participation 
somewhat altered the pace and direction of the interviews towards the style and 
interests of the qualified psychologist which may have biased the findings.   
The main recruitment criterion was that participants had experience of visual 
hallucinations. However, as identified in SOT one ‘It’s not only a visual experience’ 
this may be an unsuitable way to identify a sub-group of individuals with homogenous 
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experience. A more meaningful way to group participants may be by considering the 
psychological flexibility with which they understand their experiences.  
Clinical Implications 
The experience of visual hallucinations as ‘not only visual’ suggests they are 
not a discrete experience and interventions aimed specifically at visual hallucinations 
may only address part of the experience and distress. Instead, considering the role 
these hallucinations play in the understanding of previous life experiences and 
attending to the loop of experience and sense making with the individual might be a 
more holistic focus for therapy, as is described in Hulme (1999) and Spinelli (2007).  
Working within the client’s framework of understanding to support them 
develop a sense of agency and control over their visual hallucinations, as was seen 
in Kathryn’s experience within her psychic circle, may be a beneficial way to develop 
coping strategies, as is done with voices (Farhall, Greenwood & Jackson, 2007). This 
may be furthered by embedding these strategies with the more holistic focus of 
therapy and supporting the development of the disrupted self (Harrop & Trower, 
2001). 
The importance of coming alongside the person, listening to and engaging 
with their experiences of their reality was identified in SOTs one and three (‘It’s not 
just a visual experience’ and ‘The role of others’). This process of engagement can 
be transformative, facilitating change and psychological growth (Laing, 1967) as was 
identified in SOT five (‘Creating a narrative’). Supporting an individual along this 
journey links well with recovery principles (Amphlett, 2015) and is something 
clinicians are well placed to do. 
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Future Research  
This study is, to the author’s knowledge, the first of its kind. As such, there is 
much work to be done. Points of particular interest are: 
• How to best describe and conceptualise the experience of ‘visual 
hallucinations’ given that they are not experienced in the unidimensional way 
this term suggests.  
• Understanding the experience from different groupings of participants, such 
as the amount of psychological flexibility with which individuals understand 
their experience. This may be a more meaningful grouping of individuals and 
this could be measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (Bond 
et al., 2011). 
• Further qualitative explorations of the sense of agency experienced in and 
over the hallucinatory experience, particularly the relationship of this with 
emotional distress and contributing factors to this relationship.  
Conclusion  
Superordinate themes of ‘It’s not only a visual experience’, ‘Agency’, ‘Role of 
others’, ‘Coming to know the experience’ and ‘Creating a narrative’ were identified. 
Across participants a sense of confusion, at times of curiosity and an earnest need to 
try to understand the experiences was conveyed; these understandings were held 
with varying degrees of psychological flexibility and could contribute to feelings of 




American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders: Fourth Edition, Text Revision. Washington: APA. 
Amphlett, C. (2015). An existential approach to therapy: Core values and therapeutic 
principles. In A. Fox & A. Meaden (Eds.), Innovations in Psychosocial 
Interventions for Psychosis (pp. 131-148). Sussex: Routledge. 
Bentall, R. P., Wickham, S., Shevlin, M., & Varese, F. (2012). Do specific early-life 
adversities lead to specific symptoms of psychosis? A study from the 2007 the 
adult psychiatric morbidity survey. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 38, 734–740.  
Beresford, P., Nettle, M., & Perring, R. (2010). Towards a social model of madness 
and distress? Exploring what service users say.  York: Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. 
Biggerstaff, D., & Thompson, A. R. (2008). Interpretative phenomenological analysis 
(IPA): A qualitative methodology of choice in healthcare research. Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 5(3), 214-224. 
Bond, F. W., Hayes, S. C., Baer, R. A., Carpenter, K. M., Guenole, N., Orcutt, H. K., 
... & Zettle, R. D. (2011). Preliminary psychometric properties of the 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire–II: A revised measure of psychological 
inflexibility and experiential avoidance. Behaviour Therapy, 42(4), 676-688. 
British Psychological Society (BPS). (2000). Recent advances in understanding 
mental illness and psychotic experiences.  Leicester: British Psychological 
Society. 
129 
Brookwell, M. L., Bentall, R. P., & Varese, F. (2013). Externalizing biases and 
hallucinations in source-monitoring, self-monitoring and signal detection 
studies: a meta-analytic review. Psychological Medicine, 43(12), 2465-2475. 
Bürgy, M. (2008). The concept of psychosis: historical and phenomenological 
aspects. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 34(6), 1200-1210. 
Carter, L., Read, J., Pyle, M., & Morrison, A. (2018). “I Believe I Know Better Even 
than the Psychiatrists What Caused It”: Exploring the Development of Causal 
Beliefs in People Experiencing Psychosis. Community Mental Health Journal, 
54(6), 805-813 
Chadwick, P. D., Birchwood, M. J., & Trower, P. (1996). Cognitive therapy for 
delusions, voices and paranoia. Sussex: John Wiley & Sons. 
Chin, J. T., Hayward, M., & Drinnan, A. (2009) 'Relating’ to voices: Exploring the 
relevance of this concept to people who hear voices. Psychology & 
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research & Practice 82(1), 1-17. 
Clark, M. L., Waters, F., Vatskalis, T. M., & Jablensky, A. (2017). On the 
interconnectedness and prognostic value of visual and auditory hallucinations 
in first-episode psychosis. European Psychiatry, 41, 122-128. 
Dudley, R., Collerton, D., Nicholson, M., & Mosimann, U. (2013) Clinical 
characteristics of disclosed visual hallucinations in users of an Early 
Intervention in Psychosis Service. Psychosis: Psychological, Social and 
Integrative approaches, 5, 127-133. 
130 
Farhall, J., Greenwood, K. M., & Jackson, H. J. (2007). Coping with hallucinated 
voices in schizophrenia: a review of self-initiated strategies and therapeutic 
interventions. Clinical Psychology Review, 27(4), 476-493. 
Gauntlett-Gilbert, J., & Kuipers, E. (2005) Visual hallucinations in psychiatric 
conditions: Appraisals and their relationship to distress. British Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 44, 77-87. 
Gayer-Anderson, C., & Morgan, C. (2013). Social networks, support and early 
psychosis: a systematic review. Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences, 22(2), 
131-146. 
Harrop, C., & Trower, P. (2001). Why does schizophrenia develop at late 
adolescence? Clinical Psychology Review, 21(2), 241-265. 
Hulme, P. (1999). Collaborative Conversation. In C. Newnes, G. Holmes, and C. 
Dunn (Eds.) This is Madness: A Critical Look at Psychiatry and the Future of 
Mental Health Services. Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books. 
Janssen, I., Krabbendam, L., Bak, M., Hanssen, M., Vollebergh, W., de Graaf, R., & 
van Os, J. (2004). Childhood abuse as a risk factor for psychotic 
experiences. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 109(1), 38-45.  
Knight, M. T. D., Wykes, T., & Hayward, P. (2003). 'People don't understand': An 
investigation of stigma in schizophrenia using Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA). Journal of Mental Health, 12(3), 209-222. 
Laing, R. D. (1967) The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise. London: 
Penguin. 
131 
Laing, R.D. (1960) The Divided Self. London: Tavistock.  
Larkin, M., Watts, S., & Clifton, E. (2006). Giving voice and making sense in 
interpretative phenomenological analysis. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology, 3(2), 102-120. 
Mawson, A., Berry, K., Murray, C., & Hayward, M. (2011). Voice hearing within the 
context of hearers' social worlds: An interpretative phenomenological analysis. 
Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory Research and Practice 84, 256-272. 
McCarthy-Jones, S. Hayward, M., Waters, F., Sommer, I. E. (2016). Editorial: 
hallucinations: new interventions supporting people with distressing voices 
and/or visions Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1-3. 
McCarthy-Jones, S., Marriott, M., Knowles, R., Rowse, G., & Thompson, A. R. 
(2013). What is psychosis? A meta-synthesis of inductive qualitative studies 
exploring the experience of psychosis. Psychosis, 5(1), 1-16. 
Milligan, D., McCarthy-Jones, S., Winthrop, A., & Dudley, R. (2013). Time changes 
everything? A qualitative investigation of the experience of auditory verbal 
hallucinations over time. Psychosis: Psychological Social and Integrative 
Approaches 5(2), 107-118. 
Oorschot, M., Lataster, T., Thewissen, V., Wichers, M., & Myin-Germeys, I. (2012). 
Mobile assessment in schizophrenia: a data-driven momentary approach. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 28, 405–413. 
132 
Perry, B. M., Taylor, D., & Shaw, S. K. (2007). “You've got to have a positive state of 
mind”: an interpretative phenomenological analysis of hope and first episode 
psychosis. Journal of Mental Health, 16(6), 781-793. 
Read, J., Haslam, N., Sayce, L., & Davies, S. (2006). Prejudice and schizophrenia: a 
review of the ‘mental illness is an illness like any other’ approach. Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica 114(5), 303-318. 
Smith, J. A. (2011). Evaluating the contribution of interpretative phenomenological 
analysis. Health Psychology Review, 5(1), 9-27. 
Smith, J.A., Flowers, P., & Larkin, M. (2009). Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis: 
Theories, Methods and Research. London: Sage. 
Spinelli, E. (2007). Practicing Existential Psychotherapy: The Relational World. 
London: Sage. 
Spinelli, E. (2001). Psychosis: new existential, systemic, and cognitive-behavioral 
developments. Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 31(1), 61-67. 
Trower, P., & Chadwick, P. (1995). Pathways to defense of the self: A theory of two 
types of paranoia. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 2(3), 263-278. 
van Deurzen, E. (1998). Paradox and Passion in Psychotherapy: An existential 
approach to therapy and counselling. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Waters, F., Collerton, D., Ffytche, D., H., Jardi, R., Pins, D., Dudley, R., Dirk-Blom, J., 
Mosimann, U. P., Eperjesi, F., Ford, S., & Larøi, F. (2014) Visual 
Hallucinations in the Psychosis Spectrum and Comparative Information from 
133 
Neurodegenerative Disorders and Eye Disease. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40, 
233–245.  
Wong, S. E. (2014). A critique of the diagnostic construct schizophrenia. Research 
on Social Work Practice, 24(1), 132-141. 
Yardley, L. (2000). Dilemmas in qualitative health research. Psychology and Health, 
15, 215–228. 
Yardley, L. (2008). Demonstrating validity in qualitative psychology. In J. A. Smith 
(Ed.), Qualitative psychology: A practical guide to methods (2nd edition, 
pp.235–251). London: Sage 
134 
Press Release  
Literature review: Do Cognitive Behavioural Approaches to First Episode 
Psychosis Change an Individual’s Experience of Distress Beyond that of 
Treatment as Usual? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Literature. 
 
Introduction. Cognitive behavioural therapy for psychosis (CBTp) is 
recommended for those struggling with a first episode of psychosis (National Institute 
for health and Care Excellence (NICE), (2014).  However, there has been debate in 
the literature regarding the best way to measure the effectiveness of CBTp. Primarily 
the debate has concerned whether outcome is best captured as symptom reduction 
or as changes in emotional experience, such as a reduction in distress:  “The 
primacy of distress is a core principle of CBT, but CBT for psychosis has not always 
followed this, given its primary emphasis on psychosis outcomes.” (Birchwood & 
Trower, 2006 pp. 107). Promisingly the impact on distress has started to be 
considered and a recent review of the literature (Lincoln & Peters, 2019) looked at 
the impact of cognitive behavioural approaches (CBA) to delusions and 
hallucinations; this review identified twelve studies, most of which utilised a measure 
of distress.  
The current review focuses on those experiencing a first episode of psychosis 
and included only studies that used psychometrically valid and reliable psychological 
measures of distress that the literature identifies as important in the psychosis 
population. The review aimed to answer the question: What impact do cognitive 
behavioural approaches have on the distress felt by people during their first/early 
episode of psychosis, above that of treatment as usual (TAU)?  
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Method.  Systematic searches yielded 14 studies to be meta-analysed. 
Search terms were guided by those used in a similar review (Lincoln & Peters, 2019). 
The main criteria were any controlled intervention study where the intervention 
utilised cognitive and/or behavioural approaches with people who meet the criteria for 
a first episode/early psychosis. Data was extracted to calculate the effectiveness of 
CBA at reducing distress. The studies were allocated a quality rating using a quality 
rating tool adapted from the Cochrane Collaboration’s tool for assessing risk of bias 
in randomised trials (Higgins et al., 2011) and the Risk of Bias Assessment Tool for 
Non-randomised Studies (Kim et al., 2013). 
Analysis.  The main effect analysis showed no significant effect of CBA on 
distress above that seen in TAU across the 14 studies. There was a slight trend in 
favour of the intervention. The quality of studies was poor and this may have 
contributed to an underestimation of the treatment effect size. This can be seen in 
the application of the quality effects model to the data whereby, if all the studies were 
of a better quality (i.e. as good as the best study in the review) the effect size would 
increase by approximately 55%. Whilst this is interesting and argues the need for 
future studies to be better quality to accurately identify the magnitude of the 
treatment effect, the estimated effect size is still negligible and non-significant.  
A subgroup analysis comparing the effect in the context of specialised early 
psychosis services, compared to non-specialised services revealed that CBA had a 
significantly greater impact on distress than TAU, when provided in the context of 
non-specialised services. In the context of specialised services this effect disappears. 
It seems that the specialised services which provide care within a service model that 
was developed specifically to meet the needs of people with early psychosis has an 
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impact on a person’s experience of distress that, in the current literature, cannot be 
surpassed by adding therapy informed by cognitive behavioural approaches.  
A second subgroup analysis of the different measures of distress revealed that 
the intervention reduced hopeless significantly more than TAU did in both specialised 
and non-specialised services. This effect seems to suggest that hopelessness is 
perhaps more responsive to CB approaches than other aspects of distress. However, 
it is important not to give too much weight to this finding as only two effect sizes 
contributed towards this. 
Limitations. Study outcomes suffered as they were not designed to measure 
distress or assess the impact of a specific therapy. Furthermore, the lack of a main 
effect may be due to the use of both non-specialised and specialised early psychosis 
services as TAU. 
Future research.  Future studies would benefit from using distress measures 
as a primary outcome. Therapies other than CBA would benefit from investigation to 
consider the unique contribution they could make to service users’ care.  
Clinical implications.  The selection of services users for CBA should be 
carefully considered to weigh up the return for the service user beyond that which 
they would get from routine care offered by specialised early psychosis services.  
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Empirical paper: Making Sense of the Experience of Visual Hallucinations In 
Psychosis: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis.   
 
Introduction. Hallucinations can occur in any sensory modality; visual 
hallucinations in psychosis are the second most commonly occurring modality (after 
auditory) and they affect around 27% of those with psychosis (Waters et al., 2014).  
A review of the qualitative literature identified four overarching themes to the 
experience of psychosis: loss, identifying a need for and seeking help, rebuilding and 
re-forging life, and finally, better than new: gifts from psychosis (McCarthy-Jones, 
Marriott, Knowles, Rowse, & Thompson, 2013). It is important to note that none of 
the reviewed studies considered visual hallucinations specifically or explicitly. 
Therefore, it is impossible to know how much these themes describe the experience 
of individuals with visual hallucinations. 
Visual hallucinations as part of schizophrenia are associated with a greater 
level of distress and a poorer prognosis compared to those who experience 
schizophrenia without visual hallucinations (Clark, Waters, Vatskalis & Jablensky, 
2017; Oorschot, Lataster, Thewissen, Wichers & Myin-Germeys, 2012). The study of 
visual hallucinations and their meaning to individuals is sparse, and consequently 
successful intervention is limited (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2013; Waters et al., 2014).  
There is a call for research to provide a greater understanding of visual hallucinations 
(Dudley, Collerton, Nicholson & Mosimann, 2013). 
Aims and Method. The study aimed to understand how people with psychosis 
experience and make sense of visual hallucinations. Six participants with 
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experiences of visual hallucinations within the context of a schizophrenia spectrum 
diagnosis were interviewed. The interviews were analysed using the qualitative 
method of interpretative phenomenological analysis which allows a detailed 
ideographic understanding of participants’ experiences to be gained (Smith, Flowers 
& Larkin, 2009). 
Analysis. Five superordinate themes were identified: ‘It’s not only a visual 
experience’, ‘Agency’, ‘Role of others, ‘Coming to know the experience’ and ‘Creating 
a narrative’. Emotional experience was interwoven within each superordinate theme. 





Table of Themes Across all Participants 
Themes Description 
1. It’s not only a visual 
experience 
1.1. It’s a complex and 
multifaceted experience   
1.2. It’s just like 
everything else, 
sometimes. 
The experiences did not just occur in the visual 
sensory modality. Multiple senses and interactions 
with the experience were described and extra 
senses were involved such as sensed, felt or 
experienced. Participants also described receiving a 
communication or message from the hallucinatory 
experience.   
Participants described their experiences as 
perceived just like everything else and as different to 
normal, with an odd quality about the experience. 
2. Agency  
2.1. Sense of agency  
2.2. The role of agency in 
the emotional experience  
2.3. The role of agency in 
the sense of real-ness 
There was a variation in the amount of control or 
extent to which participants felt they played a role in 
the initiation of their visual hallucinations. All 
participants at some points in their interview talked 
about their experiences as being external to the self 
with no sense of agency.  
3. Role of others 
3.1. Shared experience or 
understanding  
3.2. They can’t/won’t 
understand  
 
 Participants talked about other people in their lives, 
both professionals and non-professionals as 
contributing to how they understood their 
experiences. These other people were at times 
experienced by some participants to be helpful, 
whilst at other times were experienced as negative 
and dismissive.  
4. Coming to know the 
experience  
4.1.  Hard to make sense 
of: wrestling with reality  
4.2. Importance of reality  
Some participants described that they had been and 
were still working through a process of coming to 
know what was real and what wasn’t. Participants 
described that their hallucinatory experiences were 
difficult to make sense of and talk about.  
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5. Creating a narrative 
5.1. Incorporating the 
experiences into pre-
existing ideas 
5.2. Loop of experience 
and sense making 
5.3.  This new way of 
thinking about myself and 
the world has changed 
things 
All participants seemed to use knowledge or 
experience they already had to make sense of their 
hallucinatory experiences. This fell into three main 
categories: 1) a spiritual explanation, 2) a link to 
previous trauma, 3) a medical/biological explanation. 
It seemed that experiences of the hallucination and 
sense making of it were relating to each other as if 
in a loop. 
  
Conclusions. The term ‘visual hallucinations’ seems to be on 
oversimplification of the experiences the participants described. The importance of 
how professionals respond to an individual’s description of their experiences is 
important. Furthermore, if clinicians can support individuals to psychologically 
engage with their psychotic experiences there is opportunity for psychological 
growth. The varying sense of agency can be linked to established literature regarding 
changes in the sense of self that can occur in psychosis (McCarthy-Jones et al., 
2013; Trower & Chadwick, 1995). The loop of experience and sense making provides 
an explanation of how individuals might appraise their experiences. Further research 
is needed to provide a more detailed definition of ‘visual hallucinations’ and to better 
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Literature Review Appendices. 
Appendix A: Identifying studies with excessive influence 
As can be seen from the forest plot in Figure 1 if Jackson, McGorry et al., (1998 
a) is omitted then the meta-analytic effect becomes significant. The modified 
treatment effect size is d =-0.13 [-0.25; -0.01] p<0.05 (p=0.03) which remains 
negligible and is marginally significant. However, the confidence intervals do 
include the synthesised treatment effect value (d=-0.09) and as such, this study is 
not considered to be exerting excessive influence on the outcome. 
 




Appendix B: Publication bias and small study effects. 
a. Funnel plot 
 
Figure 2. Funnel plot of publication bias and small study effects. 
 
b. Eggers’s test (Egger et al., 1997) 
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IRAS ID: 228510 
Participant Information Sheet   
 
The experience of visual hallucinations for individuals with a schizophrenia 
spectrum diagnosis: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis.  
 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide whether to 
take part or not it is important for you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it will involve.   
 
Please take time to read the following information carefully.   
Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or, if you would like more information.   
Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
• What is the purpose of this research? 
This study forms part of the research thesis for a doctoral student in clinical 
psychology (Charlotte Denton).  
 
The study aims to find out what it is like to experience visual hallucinations. People 
who have a diagnosis of schizophrenia can sometimes experience these. It is hoped 
that our research will help clinicians working with people with visual hallucinations to 
have a better understanding of them. Additionally, it is hoped that in the future this 





• Why have I been invited to take part?  
You have been invited to take part because your clinician has identified that you have 
experienced visual hallucinations and that you are able to talk about these.  
 
• What happens if I agree to take part? 
If you agree to take part a member of the team providing your care will pass your 
contact details to the Chief Investigator (Charlotte Denton). Charlotte will then contact 
you to arrange a face to face meeting.  
 
At this meeting, Charlotte will check that you understand what is involved in the 
study, give you another copy of this information sheet and will ask you to sign the 
consent form. You will be able to keep a copy of this information sheet and the signed 
consent form.  
 
Charlotte will then complete an interview with you. The interview will focus on your 
experience of visual hallucinations. There will be some predetermined questions, but 
you will also be free to talk about your own specific experience of visual 
hallucinations. There will be a break about half way through the interview. After the 
interview there will be some time to reflect on the experience of talking about the 
visual hallucinations and ask any questions you might have. In total, it is expected 
that this meeting will last around 90 minutes, and not more than two hours. 
  
The interview with Charlotte will be audio recorded and then typed up by Charlotte 
into a word document, this is known as a transcript. Information that directly identifies 
you (such as your name) will be removed. As soon as the transcript is completed the 




If you would like to, you can provide feedback on the analysis of the interviews. If you 
give your consent to provide feedback you be will sent a summary of the analysis in 
the post and asked to comment on how this relates to your experience of visual 
hallucinations. This may be several months after you have given your interview. A 
stamped, addressed envelope will be included for you to return your feedback within 
two weeks.  
 
• What are the risks of taking part? 
The risks of taking part in this research are low.  
Some people may find that it is upsetting to talk about their experience of visual 
hallucinations. Others may not. The person you will be talking with (Charlotte) is 
training as a Clinical Psychologist, and so is skilled at talking with people if they 
become upset.  
 
• What are the benefits of taking part? 
Whilst there are no clear clinical benefits to taking part in the study people often find 
talking about their hallucinations helpful when trying to understand them.  
   
• What will happen if I do not want to carry on with the study? 
Taking part in this research is completely voluntary. If you do decide to take part you 
are still free to withdraw during the interview without giving a reason. Whether you 
decide to take part or not, or withdraw at a later date, your care will not be affected. 
 
After the completion of the interview you have two weeks during which time you can 
change your mind and withdraw from the study. If you do change your mind you 
should contact Charlotte Denton who will remove your interview from the study.  
If you withdraw from the study during this two week period, your interview 
transcript will be destroyed but your consent form must be kept for proof of 
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withdrawal. To safeguard your rights, we will use the minimum personally-
identifiable information possible. 
  
You can find out more about how we use your data please contact Dr Andrew 
Fox (Clinical Psychologist) at  a.p.fox@bham.ac.uk. 
 
If you have not made contact after this two week period Charlotte will assume that 
you wish to continue to be involved in the study. Whether or not you decide to take 
part in the research your care will not be affected in anyway.  
 
• Expenses and payments 
You will need to visit a trust site on one occasion to give your consent to take part 
and complete the interview. This will be arranged between you and Charlotte at a 
suitable date and time. You will be reimbursed for the cost of, up to £20.  
 
• What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The interviews from this study will be analysed and the results of this analysis may be 
published in an academic journal. This study forms part of a doctoral thesis and this 
thesis will be held by the University of Birmingham Library. Portions of the research 
may be used in training and presentations.  If you would like, you can be sent a 
summary of the results to keep.  
 
• Will my information be kept confidential?  
Your information will be anonymous: your transcript and any quotes from it will not 
include any information that will identify you personally. At the meeting with Charlotte 
you will be assigned a pseudonym (a different name to your own), this is the name 




To help the analysis of the interviews some relevant quotations from some 
participants will be used. In the full thesis an example of part of a transcript may be 
included.  
 
The analysis of your anonymous interview transcript will be supervised by two 
Clinical Psychologists (Dr Andrew Fox and Dr Catherine Amphlett). In addition to this 
the analysis of your anonymous interview transcript may be shared with academic 
doctorate researchers. This is to help ensure the analysis is a fair and true 
representation of your anonymous interview transcript.  
 
If you suggest that you or someone else is at risk of harm, or if the process of talking 
about your visual hallucinations has been very upsetting for you this may be shared 
with your NHS care team. If this is the case a member of your care team will be told 
so they can ensure that you and all relevant individuals are safe and well. Charlotte 
will always try to let you know first if she thinks she needs to do this. 
 
To ensure that the research is being conducted in line with its submitted procedure 
and the relevant guidelines an audit may take place. In which case, the regulatory 
bodies and the sponsor (The University of Birmingham) may request to view the 
anonymous transcript.   
 
• How will my information be stored?  
 
Your consent form will be transported from the interview site to a secure Birmingham 
and Solihull Mental Health Foundation Trust location where it will be stored securely. 
The audio recording of your interview will be stored on an NHS encrypted memory 
stick until it is transcribed and then it will be deleted.  Upon the completion of the 
research the consent forms and anonymous electronic transcripts will be moved to 
the University of Birmingham where they will be securely stored under the 
Supervision of Charlotte Denton’s supervisor: Dr Andrew Fox (BSMHFT employee 
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and Clinical Psychologist) until ten years has passed, after which they will be 
securely destroyed. 
 
The University of Birmingham is the sponsor for this study based in the United 
Kingdom. We will be using information from you in order to undertake this study 
and will act as the data controller for this study. This means that we are 
responsible for looking after your information and using it properly.  
  
Your rights to access, change or move your information are limited, as we need 
to manage your information in specific ways in order for the research to be 
reliable and accurate.  
 
• How is this research funded? 
The research is organised and funded by the University of Birmingham  
 
• Who has reviewed this study? 
This study was given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct in the NHS by West 
Midlands, Black Country Research Ethics Committee.  
 
• What happens if I have any further concerns? 
If there are any problems or you have any concerns during the course of the study 
you can discuss them with Charlotte on the contact number below. She will do her 
best to answer your questions. If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally 





Researchers:   
Charlotte Denton: Clinical Psychologist in Training  
Dr Andrew Fox: Clinical Psychologist  
Dr Catherine Amphlett: Clinical Psychologist  
 
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Foundation Trust complaints:  
 
Customer Relations  
Complaints Department 
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust 
Trust Headquarters 
Unit 1, B1 
50 Summer Hill Road 
Birmingham  
B1 3RB 
Tel: 0121 301 1084 
 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this research please contact: 
 
Charlotte Denton  
 
Tel: 0121 414 4906; 07985 883759  
Email: CXD635@student.bham.ac.uk 
Post: School of Psychology 
University of Birmingham, 
Edgbaston 
Birmingham 








INFORMED CONSENT FORM     
 
Research site:  Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust 
Study Number: RG_17-219. 
IRAS ID:   228510 
Study Title:   The experience of visual hallucinations for individuals with a 
schizophrenia spectrum diagnosis: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. 
Researcher:  Charlotte Denton  
 
Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have understood the participant information sheet dated 10th 
July 2018 (version 3.0) for the above study.  I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time during the research interview, without giving any reason, without 
my medical/social care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I understand that the research interview will be audio-recorded  
 
4. I understand that following the research interview I will have a two-week period 







researcher to withdraw my consent, without giving any reason, without my 
medical/social care or legal rights being affected. 
 
5. I understand that the data collected during this study may be looked at by the 
researcher and relevant others at the University of Birmingham to ensure that 
the analysis is a fair and reasonable representation of the data.   
 
6. I understand that parts of the data may be made available to the NHS team 
responsible for me but only if any previously undisclosed issues of risk to me 
or another person’s safety are disclosed. I also understand that in the case of 
audit the regulatory authorities and sponsor (University of Birmingham) may 
request to view the research data.  
 
7. I confirm that I have understood the process for storage and transport of my 
data as set out in the participant information sheet dated 10th July 2018 
(version 3.0) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
 
8.  I understand that direct quotes from my interview may be published in any 
write-up of the data, but that my name will not be attributed to any such quotes 
and that I will not be identifiable by my comments. 
 
9.  I would like to provide feedback on the analysis of the interviews.  
  Please provide your postal address below. 
 
10.  I would like to receive a copy of the completed study.  
Please provide your postal address below.   
 















11. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
................................  ...................  ...................................... 
Name of participant  Date   Signature 
 
 
...............................  ...................  ...................................... 




Two copies of the completed document are to be made.  
The original will be stored in the study site file. One copy will be stored in participant’s 














Appendix H: Extract of Emergent Themes for One Participant 
Table 1 

















40, 99, 225, 
255 
I’ve actually seen 
people, actually spirt 
people, and sensing 
and hearing things what 
aren’t there. 
 
: it’s this. I was rushed 
into hospital, it started 
there like. The room 
went freezing cold and 
smoke came down 
outside, i felt like a 
ghost in the room. 
 
I saw, i thought i saw 
my double on the other 
side of the room, i didn’t 









Interaction with the self: 









Well there’s things 
about it, it sort of went 
in me a bit like. Y’know 
‘cus i was swelled up 
and lying on the bed 
and it sort of went 
inside my head. 
 
I sort of experienced the 
room went freezing cold 





Things are experienced, 
just like everything else 
14, 18, 40, 
56, 80-81, 
216, 
Darren: i’ve actually 
seen people, actually 
spirt people, and 
sensing and hearing 
things what aren’t there. 
I: sensing things that 
aren’t there?  
Darren: yeah. 
I: tell me a bit more 




Darren: i don’t know. 
They’re just 
experiences while i’ve 
been in hospital like.  
 
Experienced: spiritual   
I’ve actually seen 
people, actually spirt 
people, and sensing 
and hearing things what 
aren’t there. 
 
I sort of experienced the 
room went freezing cold 
and it went in me, so i 
don’t know 
 
I: someone that looked 
that same as you? Your 
double? 
Darren: yeah it was like 
i was experiencing 
things in there.  
 
Well it’s a spiritual side, 
i’ve experienced ghosts 
and stuff y’know its like 
there, after death or 
something. Y’know its 
real.  
 
I sort of thought i was 
experiencing god in the 
hospital. That’s how i 
explain it. 
 
I sort of got better in 
(old asylum) because i 
thought i had the 
experience with god. 
Like that’s what it was, 
that’s how i err 
understood what’s 
actually happened like 
erm. I thought god was 
spiritual side like. But it 
was also like an 




That’s what, that’s what 
was feeling in the room 




Appendix I: Extract of Themes and Subthemes for One Participant 
Table 2 








Darren: I’ve actually seen people, actually spirt 
people, and sensing and hearing things what aren’t 
there. 
I: Sensing things that aren’t there?  
Darren: Yeah. 
I: tell me a bit more about that?  
Darren: I don’t know. They’re just experiences while 
I’ve been in hospital like. I don’t know why that makes 
them come on like.  
I: What sort of things did you… 
Darren: I experienced a ghost just outside my ear, just 
outside my ear to the back.  
I: and when you were hearing that, did you see 
anything?  
Darren: No, I was sensing things at the time, 
1.1 
Seen 
I’ve actually seen people, actually spirt people, and 
sensing and hearing things what aren’t there. 
 
saw a girl, a woman. I was on the phone to someone 
and she just appeared, she just appeared right in front 





I was just hearing things like.  
I: you were hearing thing, you said you sensed things 
too, in your body?  
Darren: yeah  
I: and you saw some one that looked the same as 
you, your double? 




it’s this. I was rushed into hospital, it started there like. 
The room went freezing cold and smoke came down 
outside, I felt like a ghost in the room. 
1.3.1 
Interacted 
with my body 
and mind 
Well there’s things about it, it sort of went in me a bit 
like. Y’know ‘cus I was swelled up and lying on the 
bed and it sort of went inside my head 
 
Darren: There was just a warm feeling in the room 
like. Sort of… I had three words going in my head, that 
it was actually telling me like. Authority, love and care 
I: Authority, love and care?  
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Darren: of myself. Erm it was when I sort of thought I 
was experiencing God in the hospital. That’s how I 
explain it.  
 
 
Darren: I don’t know its probably spiritual, probably 
comes from God. ‘Cus I was hallucinating when I had 
my operations on my arm (gestures to what looks like 
a surgical scar on wrist for duration of this speech). 
And it was like I was sensing what was going on with 
the actual cut what I had in hospital, erm there was 
two veins sticking out where they operated like. When 
I was looking at that when I was in hospital it was like 




































Appendix K: Master Table of Cross Participant Themes and Quotes  
Table 9 





It’s not only a visual experience 
Description Hallucinations were not bound by the visual sensory modality and were perceived as both normal and 
different to normal.  
Subtheme 1.1 It’s a complex and multifaceted experience 
Description The experiences did not just occur in the visual sensory modality. Multiple senses and interactions with 
the experience were described and extra senses were involved such as sensed, felt or experienced. 




Darren “it sort of went in me a bit like. Y’know ‘cus I was swelled up and lying on the bed and it sort of went 
inside my head” 
 
“D: There was just a warm feeling in the room like. Sort of (trails off), I had three words going in my 
head, that it was actually telling me like. Authority, love and care. 
I: Authority, love and care?  





“I’ve actually seen people, actually spirt people, and sensing and hearing things what aren’t there. 
I: Sensing things that aren’t there?  
D: Yeah. 
I: tell me a bit more about that?  
… 
D: I experienced a ghost just outside my ear, just outside my ear to the back.  
I: and when you were hearing that, did you see anything?  
D: No, I was sensing things at the time “  
 
“I: I guess what I’m wondering is, you said that you feel and sense things that weren’t there. How did you 
know that they weren’t there?  
Darren: Well there’s things about it, it sort of went in me a bit like. Y’know ‘cus I was swelled up and lying 
on the bed and it sort of went inside my head.”  
 
Jess “it [the cloud] formed a cross and I could see Jesus on this cross in the sky. I cried. Because I really 
thought I was seeing this: This is a calling for me” 
 
“I remember sitting at the porch and the door, the front door being opened because I pushed it the door 
was open and I pushed it ajar. Up until then my hallucinations were visual hallucinations were only visual 
I weren’t… I wasn’t interacting with them but this time I was and I could hear my nan and my dad saying 
‘just shoot her, get rid of her, everything will be normal again’ I remember them saying that. I could hear 
them saying that. But I mean I’m not in contact with them to be able to speak to them. But I know, I feel it 
was so real sitting on the porch step, the door was open, it was definitely open” 
 
“I remember sitting in the caravan and looking up to the sky and gradually the clouds were forming this 
picture that I could see, but forming the shape of a cross and I can remember thinking at the time Is this 
really happening? Is this really going on? And it did yeah, it formed a cross and I could see Jesus on this 





Kathryn “All of a sudden I saw this tunnel, it was black and I was travelling down this tunnel faster that the speed 
of light. Flashing lights going off either side it was white and yellow lights and I was catapulted down this 
tunnel and my hair was blowing behind me but there was no wind!” 
 
 
“it felt, it sounded (pause) well it didn’t sound it felt like some invisible hand around my throat” 
Rashid “No, it’s not like a scene or a picture it’s like alive. Y’know movement. Charlotte it’s never ever a picture, 
it’s like its going on around me y’know it’s like active” 
 
“I: the things that you see, you said that see a jungle war fare, and its moving in front of you? 
R: yes 
I:  does it feel separate to you or? 
R: No, it feels like I’m involved” 
John “J: The girl’s peeping through the fence, she must have been because that’s what they’ve been doing.  
Psych: did, did you see her?  
J: No I just heard her, but I presumed that she was at the back of the fence over there and see me sit 
down on the other side. So then just she said: ‘he’s there’, with great delight and it, her boyfriend said 
‘where is he’.  He’s on the other end and I’m on the other side. I see them everyday” 
Sally “S: I was just getting some milk out the fridge because I was making a drink, and someone was standing 
behind the door dressed in black and with a black coat and he was hitting me in the face.” 
 
“S: yeah! And they couldn’t see it, only I could see it! 
I: and it was right there and you were there and this guy with the chain saw. And you asked your sister, 
what did you say?  
S: she couldn’t see it  
Psych: and was it a guy with a chainsaw or was it just a chainsaw?  
S: it was just the chainsaw, it was as if I couldn’t see him. 




Subtheme 1.2 It’s just like everything else, sometimes 
Description This subtheme was polarised. Participants described their experiences as not special and perceived just 
like everything else. Or as different to normal, with an odd quality about the experience and perception. 
Participants 
contributing 
Darren, John, Sally, Jess, Rashid 
Darren “I don’t know I was just hearing things like.”  
 
“I dunno its just the spiritual side like.”  
 
“Darren: I’ve actually seen people, actually spirt people, and sensing and hearing things what aren’t 
there. 
… 
I: tell me a bit more about that?  
D: I don’t know. They’re just experiences while I’ve been in hospital like.”  
 
“I: I guess what I’m wondering is, you said that you feel things that weren’t there. How did you know that 
they weren’t there?  
D: Well there’s things about it, it sort of went in me a bit like. Y’know ‘cus I was swelled up and lying on 
the bed and it sort of went inside my head.” 
 
John “J: Just like I’m with you now, I see you now I see these visions these people and hear these voices just 
the same.  
I: so they seem exactly the same they feel the same? 




“well I see, if I’m seeing things I’ve got two eyes. I’ve got two ears. Just like everybody else. I’ve got very 
sensitive ears I can hear a pin drop”. 
Sally “S: I was just getting some milk out the fridge because I was making a drink, and someone was standing 
behind the door dressed in black and with a black coat 
… 
I: Ok so you were sort of getting milk out the fridge and how did you notice the person in black? 
S: I just seen him.” 
 
“I: so you said that you see people with knifes and chainsaws and is that something, do they feel or look 
as real as I do or is there something different about them?  
S: they’re not, they’re just like faint, I don’t really (trails off)” 
 
“S: …I just lie, I’m lying down and I just see them and I just go to sleep just like. 
I: So you lie in bed at night and you just go to sleep, and do you see them when you’re falling asleep, or? 
S: I just ignore them and just go to sleep. I just do that. I don’t really like put, erm and there’s times that 
I’ve heard voices and stuff.” 
Jess 
 
J: I think, I hope, I’m able to recognize what’s real and what’s hallucination.  
I: Has that become quite a big part of your life now? 
J: Yeah, yeah, absolutely.  
I: how often would you say you think about whether things are real or not? 
J: Everyday.   









The SOT of agency captures the experience of participants having a varying sense of agency over their 
hallucinatory experiences. The relationship between the sense of agency and how the visual 
hallucination is experienced varied. Two main areas in which the role of agency seemed to feature is in 
the emotional experience and in the experience of ‘real-ness’  
 
Subtheme 2.1 Sense of agency  
Description 
There was a variation in the amount of control or extent to which they played a role in the initiation of 
their visual hallucinations. All participants at some points in their interview talked about their experiences 





“D: There was two veins sticking out where they operated like. When I was looking at that (gestures to 
surgical scar on his wrist) when I was in hospital it was like it was being cured like.  
I: Ok  
D: the healing of the wound like  
I: So what did you see?  
… 
D: I had a cut on my wrist from where the doctors had done the operation and I was visualising that it 
had been cured. Like a hallucination towards the wound like.” 
 
“D: I don’t know, I just looked behind me and he was gone like. He was there and then he wasn’t. I think 
I can see things but I don’t know if it’s my mind playing tricks or what.”  
 
Jess 
“Thinking that people are being killed, watching people be killed, actually seeing it with your eyes.”  
 
“I’m seeing a monk in the garden that’s not moving. It’s time for bed! (laughs) quite scary.  
I: So that ‘it’s time for bed’ that sounds like you were quite dismissive about it, initially? 




“I remember sitting at the porch and the door, the front door being opened because I pushed it the door 
was open and I pushed it ajar” 
 
“I’m seeing Jesus Christ on a cross here…Visual Hallucinations didn’t come into my mind at that point” 
 
“Thinking that people are being killed, watching people be killed, actually seeing it with your eyes 
Kathryn 
“I: do they come in the day time? 
K: When I communicate with spirit. When I meditate.  
I: So now it’s more of a errr, choice? 
K: Yes I’m in control.  
I: How does that feel?  
K: Good.”     
 
“I’m at the moment going to a psychic development circle every week and they’re teaching us how to 
communicate with spirts.” 
 




“R: I just see water, you know the sea. I imagine myself on a ship, a battle ship and a boat is going 
through the waves. I’m on the boat and then the water comes.  
I: and when you say you’re on the boat are you imagining that? 
R: No, I can see the boat, going through the water. I’m on a boat myself but I can see the other boat 
from where I am.  I never thought about seeing or imagining y’know I don’t know the difference.” 
 
“R: Yeah, it’s when I’m looking at the ceiling. Y’know I just imagine, I wander off.  
I: So is it something that you see in your mind, like in your imagination or is it something that you see out 
in front of you?  
R: Both. Yes.  
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I: and what’s the difference between those two? 
R: difference is, y’know in your imagination you can imagine just about anything. But then with the 
visionary hallucinations I want them to stop sometimes. When they get too strong, they get too violent, 
too violent, and with imagination, a lot I can imagine nice things and sometimes being in your mind on 
holiday, nice hot place.  
I: But that’s not true of the hallucinations? 
R: No”    
 
John “I see him pass the door today, the one that was saying last night ‘where is he’.” 
Sally 
“S: I just picture them there and just like ermm picture knifes and things like that and I can see them 
cutting my throat at the back of me and stuff.  
I: so you said you can picture and you can see them. Is that two different sorts of experiences or is it the 
same? 
S: the same” 
 
“S: when I was at home, I’d just be there thinking about my mum and just picture them and stuff.  
I: and do you see them here like you would see this chair or is it a bit different?  
S: Erm, bit different  
I: can you tell me how its different? 
S: doesn’t bother me, I just think its myself sometimes so it doesn’t bother me.  
I: what do you mean, you think its yourself? 
S: probably that I’m imaging things myself and but the, when that, when someone was in the kitchen and 
tried to hit me in the face that wasn’t myself.  
I: that was different?  
S: that was different.  
I: what was different about that?  




“S: They come well, I’ll tell you the truth. When they happen to me in the xxxx my mum was asleep on 
the seatee and I had a friend with me, his name was Simon and I fell asleep and, I woke up in my dream 
that I was chopped into little pieces and I didn’t know how to wake up from that.  
I: so you’re there with your friend and you fell asleep and you had a dream.  
S: I didn’t have a dream it actually happened, I was dreaming that actually well, it wasn’t a dream it 
actually happened.  
I: tell me a bit about what happened.  
S: I was just asleep, and someone let some people in whilst I was asleep and I felt like as if I was 
chopped up in little pieces” 
 
Subtheme 2.2  The role of agency in the emotional experience 
Description 






“I: So tell me more about the spiritual feeling  
D: I dunno, it’s just the spiritual side like.  
I: What is, was there a particular quality about it?  
D: There was just a warm feeling in the room like. Sort of [pause] I had three words going in my head, 
that it was actually telling me like. Authority, love and care. 
I: Authority, love and care?  





“Some [of the visual hallucinations are] more distressing than others, especially the time just before 
hospital, before I went into hospital. The period of time that I spent in my flat on my own, that was the 
most disturbing. Thinking that people are being killed, watching people be killed, actually seeing it with 
your eyes.”  
Kathryn 
“K: I told this medium, an international medium what was happening to me and he said ‘tell the spirit 
when they visit you at night that they’re disturbing my rest and that I will work with them in the day time’. 
And I did and I don’t get any spirit visitation at night now. 
I: OK that’s better, so you can rest now? 
K: Yes 
…. 
K: Yes I’m in control.  
I: How does that feel?  
K: Good “ 
Rashid  
“R: difference is, y’know in your imagination you can imagine just about anything. But then with the 
visionary hallucinations I want them to stop sometimes. When they get too strong, they get too violent, 
too violent, and with imagination, a lot I can imagine nice things and sometimes being in your mind on 
holiday, nice hot place.  
I: But that’s not true of the hallucinations? 
R: No” 
John 
“J: Just like I’m with you now, I see you now I see these visions, these people and hear these voices just 
the same.  
I: so they seem exactly the same the feel the same 
J: quite physical 
I: can you describe that to me, what that’s like? 
J: What that’s like, let me see. Traumatising. Disturbing. Upsetting. Nerve wrecking. Shocking. 
Nightmare. Horrific. Horrendous and the likes. Why don’t they leave me alone? They’re not giving up, 
they’re not letting it go, I know that much, I’ve heard them say that” 
Sally 
“S: when I was at home, I’d just be there thinking about my mum and just picture them and stuff.  
I: and do you see them here like you would see this chair or is it a bit different?  
S: Erm, bit different  
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I: can you tell me how its different? 
S: doesn’t bother me, I just think its myself sometimes so it doesn’t bother me.  
I: what do you mean, you think its yourself? 
S: probably that I’m imaging things myself” 
Subtheme 2.3  The role of agency in the sense of real-ness 
Description 






“D: There was two veins sticking out where they operated like. When I was looking at that [gestures to 
surgical scar on his wrist] when I was in hospital it was like it was being cured like.  
I: Ok  
D: the healing of the wound like  
I: So what did you see?  
… 
D: I had a cut on my wrist from where the doctors had done the operation and I was visualising that it 
had been cured. Like a hallucination towards the wound like.”   
 
Jess 
“I remember sitting at the porch and the door, the front door being opened because I pushed it the door 
was open and I pushed it ajar. Up until then my hallucinations were visual hallucinations, were only 
visual I weren’t, I wasn’t interacting with them but this time I was.  
… But I know, I feel it was so real sitting on the porch step, the door was open, it was definitely open, but 




“I: So what… how did it feel seeing him there physically I front of you?  
K: Angry, I felt Angry. I thought what the hell are you doing in my bed room! I mean this was about half 
past 11 at night. And then when he disappeared I realised it was a ghost. And the next day I asked some 
of the girls in the house if anybody had died in the house. And they said yes an old man had dies in the 
house.  
I: Ok. So what led you to the conclusion  that it was a ghost?  
K: Well what could it have been!” 
Rashid  
“R: It was like yknow reality. Real.  
I: Tell me a bit more about that realness 
R: they were like moving and I could actually see them, I could actually see their helmets their faces, 
their uniforms, their shoes, their weapons, their green camouflage uniforms yknow.” 
John 
“if I’m seeing things I’ve got two eyes, I’ve got two ears just like everybody else. I’ve got very sensitive 
ears I can hear a pin drop so never the less I’m hearing (whispers) *voices*, not very pleasant look. I’m 
seeing people, stalking me and plotting to harm me. Let’s see, I go to the team, explain to the team, the 
team say they don’t exist they’re not real only heaven exists. Mmmm? So where does that leave me?” 
Sally 
“S: I just think its myself sometimes so it doesn’t bother me.  
I: what do you mean, you think its yourself? 
S: probably that I’m imaging things myself and but the, when that, when someone was in the kitchen and 
tried to hit me in the face that wasn’t myself.  
I: that was different?  
S: that was different.  
I: what was different about that?  












Participants talked about other people in their lives, both professionals and non-professionals as 
contributing to how they understood their experiences, which in turn seemed to relate to the experiences 
they had. The role of others appeared to be experienced in two main ways: it either helped and felt 
positive to the participants or it felt negative: alienating and angering them 
Subtheme 3.1 Shared experience or understanding 
Description 
Other people were at times experienced by some participants to be helpful, and contributing to the 
participants feeling calmer, safer, more in control, hopeful and normal. 
Pps Jess, Kathryn, John 
Jess 
“I feel more normal when I come to drop in (informal social group within EIP) than I do anywhere else.” 
 
“I can open up more to other service users than I can to my best friend that I’ve know for all of my life. 
Because they know what you’re going on about is real.”  
 
“I: I guess I’m wondering, the people who haven’t had visual hallucinations, but have had other sorts of 
hallucinations. How did they respond to you? 
Jess: Alright, strangely. And that puts you at ease as well. But alright. [they] knew that I wasn’t talking y’know a load of bullshit. It was real. And 
they understand that. And that makes me feel better within myself.” 
Kathryn 
“And my sister in America who I told about it a couple of weeks ago and described to her what had 
happened. She’s studying her PhD in California university in mind and consciousness and she said I’m 
very lucky to experience this. She said once you’ve made the connection to the other side you come 
back with psychic abilities.” 
 
“K: They’re trying to communicate with me. And I told this medium, an international medium what was 
happening to me and he said ‘tell the spirit when they visit you at night that they’re disturbing my rest 




“K: I’m in an environment where I go to psychic meetings, I’m with other psychics who have had similar 
experiences to me and people who I can relate to.  
I: and what’s that like?  
K: It feels comforting. I feel errrm, right where I am. I feel great that I can actually talk about my 
experiences to people who have had similar experiences like hearing voices not realising what they are, 
and then realising and finding out that they’re spirit.” 
John 
“J: A clearer horizon, that’s what I’m hoping for.  A whole new horizon 
I: So that’s what you’re hoping for the future?  
J: Mmm that’s what I’m hoping to get out of the likes of this and cooperating with the team I’ve been in 
the service for a good 35 years and I’m a volunteer and I was helping. 
… 
Psych: So we have voluntary and involuntary patients here  
J: For the doctor to try and help me, and me to help myself.” 
Subtheme 3.2 They can’t/won’t understand  
Description 
Other people, including professionals were at times experienced by participants in a negative way. 
Participants described feeling dismissed or scared and felt less inclined to share their experiences. 
Participants 
contributing   
All 
Darren 
“Darren: Not really no. I don’t talk to people, I don’t talk about it.  
I: What do you think stops you from talking to people?  
Darren: Probably they won’t understand I don’t think. 
I: So they wouldn’t understand?  
Darren: I don’t think… not many people been through what I have.  
I: and how does that feel, that not many people have been through what you have? 
Darren: I don’t know, It’s probably a lack of understanding I suppose, like. I think, I’ve had a different life 




“I: So did you talk to other people about it? 
Jess: Yeah, my ex-partner’s sister at the time. She was pretty close to me and she was pretty freaked 
out by what I was saying.” 
 
“Jess: look on people’s faces when you tell them that hear and see things that they don’t hear and see 
there’s a look of fear that I get sometimes with people. And that makes you feel about anxious.  
… 
I: And when you’re talking to other people and you see that fear go across their face?  
Jess: You know that it’s time to shut up.  You’re freaking them out.” 
 
Kathryn 
“Yes, yes. Now I know I’m dealing with professional people, but they’ve wrongly diagnosed me and they 
don’t know anything about the spiritualism. As far as they’re concerned it’s schizophrenia and it’s not.  
I: and that’s, it makes you very angry? 
K: It does yes, I’m dealing with ignorant people. People that don’t know anything about spiritualism” 
 
“K: if you haven’t had experience of spiritualism you’re a bit kind of ignorant to the fact that spirit 
communication with actual spirits is what I’ve been doing.” 
 
“K: the doctors, the psychiatric doctors because they’re that bloody ignorant they don’t know what they’re 
dealing with.  
I: Ok, so you put the psychic circle on hold whilst you were in the acute ward and then for some time 
whilst you were here.  
K: Yes, yes. For two years I’ve been incarcerated in hospital, they’ve been thinking and saying ‘Oh it’s 
schizophrenia, she’s a paranoid schizophrenia and I’m not. My friends know I’m not a paranoid 
schizophrenia, it’s only these doctors who think it. And its on my notes and I don’t like it and I want to 
prosecute them” 
Rashid 
“Sometimes y’know at home when I’m lying down on the sofa that’s when they’re worse, when I’m alone. 




“J: I’m convinced they’re real and I’m thinking that the team work in collaboration and hoping I just to go 
along with it  
I: the team are in collaboration with? 
J: with the voices and the hallucinations because they’re not taking their time when they say its not real. 
… 
I’m seeing people, stalking me and plotting to harm me. Let’s see, I go to the team, explain to the team, 
the team say they don’t exist they’re not real, only heaven exists. Mmmm? So where does that leave 
me?” 
Sally 
“S: erm, its confusing I mean from there on, from that day to this I haven’t been very well. But I did tell 
my mum about it but she thought I was silly. Mmm. People think I was going crazy they didn’t, um they 
think that I’m pathetic probably and things like that.  
I: Ok, so quite, yeah negative things. Is that something they’ve said to you? 
S: nods 
I: yeah. Erm so it sounds like sharing what you’ve experience has been, what, I don’t know quite hard 
maybe? 




Coming to know the experience 
Description 
Participants that they had been and were still working through a process of coming to know what was 
real and what wasn’t. The importance of this reality varied across the participants. This process of 
coming to know was quite an emotionally fraught experience for participants. 
Subtheme 4.1 
Hard to make sense of: wrestling and testing reality 
 
Description 
Participants described that their hallucinatory experiences were difficult to make sense of and talk 
about. A sense of wrestling with reality emerged, as did the idea that reality is a shared experience. 
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Pps Darren, Jess, Sally 
Darren 
“Darren: er, (the old asylum) is in (place-name) somewhere. I saw, I thought I saw my double on the 
other side of the room, I didn’t know what was happening.” 
 
“D: I just looked behind me and he was gone like. He was there and then he wasn’t. I think I can see 
things but I don’t know if it’s my mind playing tricks or what.  
I: So did you have a question in your mind as to whether it was real or not?  
Darren: yeah, whether its real.  
I: Can you tell me a bit more about that questioning?  
Darren: (My psychologist) said it feels real to me like so, it must be happening. It’s real to me, like I say 
I: Can you tell me a bit more about that questioning?  
I: And at the time did you have a question, a wondering if it was real or not?  
Darren: erm. No it was what I saw and feel. It was real to me what happened” 
 
“I: So do you think you make sense of it, the hallucinations, differently now to how you  did at the time?  
Darren: I dunno really. I dunno why, what is happening like. ‘Cus I was probably ill at  the time like.  
I: So it sounds like you’re quite confused, quite scared?  
Darren: Yep.” 
Jess 
“Is this a calling from God? How am I supposed to deal with this? How am I supposed to, What, How 
am I seeing a monk in the garden?” 
 
“J: Now this must be a hallucination, because I can’t, because it was so real. I remember sitting at the 
porch and the door, the front door being opened because I pushed it, the door was open and I pushed 
it ajar… I could hear my nan and my dad saying ‘just shoot her, get rid of her, everything will be normal 
again’ I remember them saying that. I could hear them saying that. But I mean, I’m not in contact with 
them to be able to speak to them. But I know, I feel it was so real sitting on the porch step, the door 
was open, it was definitely open, but it couldn’t have been it must have been a hallucination. 
I: What makes you say it must have been a hallucination? 
J: Because, err, because, I don’t think they really had a gun. And, but I still don’t, it was so real, 
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pushing that door that door was open and those voices I heard it. But now I know, well, well I don’t 
actually.” 
 
“J: I think I’ve accepted it well, at first it was a bit weird. Hallucination, visual hallucination like. I thought 
people could see what I was seeing because it was that real.  
I: and when you say it was a bit weird, tell me about that 
J: Bit weird?  
I: Yeah  
J: Then you know you’ve got problems don’t you. So that’s what I meant by weird. That erm, coming to 
terms and accepting what I’m experiencing is a visual hallucination, that it’s not something that 
everybody’s seen.”    
 
“Jess: It’s scary at first, but then you know that you’re in trouble if you’re the only one who’s 
experiencing this. So I knew that something was going on in my brain, I just didn’t know what. I could 
hear and see things that other people weren’t hearing and seeing.” 
Sally 
“I: How are you finding thinking about them like this? 
S: Hard, because I’ve never really hard to speak to anyone about it before and I just, yeah.” 
 
“I: she didn’t get it OK. So you were being chopped up into pieces. How did you kind of come back 
together again because I can see that you’re all one 
S: Laughs. Erm. I don’t know, its just happened. (laugh), I don’t know what happened  
I: can you try and remember? 
S: sorry I don’t I find it very confusing” 
Subtheme: 
4.2 
Importance of reality 
Description 
The question of whether it is important that experiences are real or not varied across participants. 
Some made it clear that it was very important that their experiences were real, and it seemed important 
for them to communicate this in their interviews. Whilst other participants did not focus of the 





Kathryn, Rashid, John 
Kathryn 
“I: First off I guess I want to ask, have you experienced what people might term visual hallucinations? 
K: They’re no hallucinations they’re visions.  
I: They’re visions OK.  
K: erm, I’ve had premonitions, visions and I’ve had spirit visitations. I’m a psychic.  
I: And visions is what you prefer to call them?  
K: Yes 
I: Ok, that’s good to know because people have different ways they like to talk about it.  
K: Spiritualism has been around for donkeys’ years. And if you haven’t had experience of spiritualism 
you’re a bit kind of ignorant to the fact that spirit communication with actual spirits is what I’ve been 
doing.” 
Rashid 
“I: and has that (professionals’ explanation of his experiences as visual hallucinations) changed your 
understanding of what you see? 
R: not really no, because I think I’d always get them I think. There’s no way I’d ever stop them. No way. 
Never stop them. So I don’t want it to have a big impact on me, so that’s why I don’t make a great deal 
out of it. I don’t really wanna act on them. I think so long as they’re managed or you’re in control of 
them then it’s not too bad” 
 
“I don’t want to believe they’re real, see. I don’t think, No I’ve never thought they’re real … because 
y’know if I start believing that they’re real then I’d really think to myself that I’m not y’know like sane. I’d 
think that I’m mentally unwell” 
 
“R: They were just like people, they felt real. It wasn’t like it was a picture or a video on a screen. It was 
like y’know reality. Real.” 
John 
“I: is there, is there a way that you can work out what’s there and what’s not really there, or, what’s it 
like? 








Creating a narrative   
Description 
Across all participants there was a theme of creating a narrative to explain their experiences. Multiple 
narratives were considered, the relationship of participants’ explanations of their experiences to the 
experiences themselves is explored.  
Across participants it varied within transcripts as to how firmly these explanations were held on to. 
Subtheme: 
5.1 
Incorporating the experiences into pre-existing ideas  
Description 
All participants seemed to use knowledge or experience they already had to make sense of their 
hallucinatory experiences. This fell into three main categories: a spiritual explanation, a link to previous 




5.1.1 The spiritual side 
Participants 
contributing 
Darren, Jess, Kathryn 
Darren 
“D: well it sort of tells you there’s something there anyway. I mean I hadn’t believed in anything like that 
but it shows you that there’s something there 
I: when you say that there’s something there, what do you mean by that? 
D: Well it’s a spiritual side, I’ve experienced ghosts and stuff y’know it’s like there, after death or 
something. Y’know it’s real” 
 
“I don’t know, I don’t really why it was happening anyway. I think it’s all to do with my mum dying and 




“I could see it … and I remember thinking maybe, maybe this is a calling … I questioned all of my 
beliefs and what, y’know I’m seeing Jesus Christ on a cross here! What the, what Is it time for me to 
change or is it a sign for me?”    
Kathryn 
“I’ve had premonitions, visions and I’ve had spirit visitations. I’m a psychic” 
 
“I: And what lead you to use the term visions?  
K: Everybody’s got a pineal glad just above the eye, above the nose in the brain. And once that’s 
activated people can experience psychic abilities. Now everybody’s got one but everbody’s  pineal 
gland is not activated.  
I: yours was activated?  
K: Yes, some years back. Back in 1986, after my stepmother died” 
 
“I: what about your parents?  
K: They died, their both dead. Passed over.  
I: and do they communicate with you at all?  
K: My father does.  
I: And what’s that like? 
K: It’s very emotional, I mean if your parents communicated with you you’d feel emotional. I miss him, I 
love him, y’know” 
5.1.2 Link to previous trauma 
Participants 
contributing 
Jess, Sally, John 
Jess 
“The visual and the auditory hallucinations were based on what I was going through at the time. I had 
I’d gone to the police station to report my Uncle, he errm. He errm he sexually abused me when I was a 
child and I took the first step in going to the police station and telling them that. Disconnected with my 
family because they don’t believe me. Then I moved into my flat and I hadn’t seen any of my family for 
quite a while. And the auditory hallucinations and the visual hallucinations were all based around the 
fact that I’d gone to the police. That there were people that didn’t believe me, that thought I’d ruined 




“Psych: before the voices and that, and do you make a link between that the experiences with these 
girls that were kind of bullying or, because I just know that you’ve had some quite difficult or traumatic 
experiences with, erm, do you think that they are related to the voices in anyway? 
S: (nods) 
I: how do you think they were related  
S: I think they used to know each other.  
I: so you think the voices used to know these girls?  
S: (nods) 
I: and what about the people that you see? did they used to know the girls as well or? 
S: (nods)” 
John 
“J: well my face it doesn’t fit in.  
I: what do you mean by that? 
J: you need to have a word with my team, they can give you a lot more information.” 
5.1.3 Medical/biological explanation 
Participants 
contributing 
Darren, Jess, Rashid 
Darren 
“D: [My psychologist] said it was because I wasn’t well at the time which is probably right yeah.  
I: It was because you weren’t well at the time?  
D: I probably wasn’t well at the time.  “ 
Jess 
“I knew that something was going on in my brain, I just didn’t know what. I could hear and see things 
that other people weren’t hearing and seeing.” 
Rashid 
“My thoughts are that I don’t think they’re normal, the visionary hallucinations I don’t think they’re 
normal so I don’t think everybody gets them. I think they’re related to mental health, so I think if you 
don’t suffer from depression or mental health issues or bipolar I don’t think you get them. That’s what 
my thoughts are. I think my thoughts are that suffers of illnesses get them. But normal people don’t.” 
Subtheme: 
5.2 




The experiences (during psychosis or prior to it) were used to help make sense of their visual 
hallucinations, and that this understanding of the hallucinatory experiences then seems to have a 
relationship with their subsequent experiences. It is not clear at what point in the cycle this process 






“D: I was sensing things at the time, that was while I was in (old asylum), my mum and brother had died 
[pause] 
…  
I: OK, and you were sensing and feeling things?  
Darren: It’s this: I was rushed into hospital, it started there like. The room went freezing cold and smoke 
came down outside, I felt like a ghost in the room” 
 
“probably It’s a good thing though, got to be, it’s got to be spiritual.” 
Jess 
“J: it [visual hallucinations] could be quite dangerous.  
I: quite dangerous?  
Jess: Yeah, yeah I think so.  
I: dangerous in what way? 
J: How you interpret your hallucinations. Or if you’re even able to tell that you’re having a hallucination, 
because at first I didn’t know they were hallucinations” 
 
“J: The hallucination at the time, it was, I remember seeing my brother walking towards my flat because 
he wanted to speak to me because of what I’d done, because I’d gone to the police station and 
because he’d come into contact with me that’s why he was shot. That’s what I thought was going on, in 
my brain. Seeing my brother shot. And then shortly after that I erm I think I went a bit crazy actually 
after that.  
I: Do you remember what happened?  
J: I ran out into the street, without any shoes on erm, I thought that, the message that, what I was 
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experiencing at the time was telling me that I had to martyr myself in order to save the rest of family 
because they too would be affected and maybe killed. So I ran in front of a lorry. Because I thought that 
was going to be able to save everyone.” 
 
“The mind is powerful, I understand that now 
… 
powerful in the sense that erm, these could, hallucinations could either make me feel, I could feel at 




“K: They [my parents] died, they’re both dead. Passed over.  
I: and do they communicate with you at all?  
K: My father does.  
I: And what’s that like? 
K:  It’s very emotional, I mean if your parents communicated with you you’d feel emotional. I miss him I 
love him, y’know” 
 
“K: they’re my guides and they make sure that I’m safe and I ground myself and I talk to spirit.  
I: and they’re quite positive then? 
K: yes they are yes” 
Rashid 
“its that I don’t want to believe that they’re real. I don’t think I’ve ever, I’ve never really opened up to  a 
lot of people about the things that I go through. That’s why I think: I don’t want to believe they’re real, 
see. I don’t think, No I’ve never thought they’re real… because y’know if I start believing that they’re 
real then I’d really think to myself that I’m not y’know like sane. I’d think that I’m mentally unwell” 
John 
“J: They’re quite normal people, quite normal individuals  
Psych: so so you’re not able to differentiate whether they are like a visual hallucination or an actual 
person is that right? 
J: I know it’s an actual person  
Psych: you know 
J: I’m convinced  
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Psych: Yeah but you know that they want to harm you, you believe that they want to harm you 
J: Indeed, indeed, indeed” 
 
“J: Traumatising. Disturbing. Upsetting. Nerve wrecking. Shocking. Nightmare. Horrific. Horrendous 
and the likes. Why don’t they leave me alone?” 
 
“J: I ask her am I in trouble? The lady [CPN] turn round and tell me no. Now that’s a weight off my 
shoulders. 
I: so you thought you might have been in trouble? 
J: Indeed, big trouble” 
Sally 
“S: Its like as if, someone’s got a grudge against me or something and I’ve not, I’ve done, I haven’t’ 
hurt no one. I know I haven’t.  
I: but you feel like someone must have a grudge against you, what makes you say that? 
S: Erm, I don’t know, because, they [visual hallucinations] think like because I’m a good person and 




This new way of thinking about myself and the world has changed things. 
Description 
Participants explained that their experiences have altered their understanding of themselves and of the 





“I’ve heard people have had visits of spirits, when they’ve lost members of their family y’know. And I 
wouldn’t believe them if it didn’t happen to me like. It’s changed my perspective of things anyway.” 
 
“Darren: No not really. Well it’s been positive and negative. It more like the spiritual side, it’s made me 




“Darren: I don’t know I think the spiritual side came out when my mum died. He Helped me get through 
it when I was in that house anyway I was only there for two weeks.” 
 
“D: it changes your belief system like. I never believed in anything like that spiritual side) until then 
y’know. I mean I was just getting on with my life, football, music and I ended up in hospital and it 
changes your whole life perspective” 
 
Jess 
“J: strangely despite everything that’s happened I’m actually a better person now.  
I: Better how, in what way?  
J: The way that I look at things, the way that I perceive things. I try and be a nicer person now towards 
people.” 
 
“Jess: I wasn’t a very nice person to some people and to myself. So, I thought that all of this was to, 
maybe it was, maybe I needed to be within a monastery kind of.. yeah, I just thought maybe it was 
time, this is it now. Someone’s looking over me and they need me to change, I need to change. 
Somethings happening, why is it all religious at the time.  
I: and did you think that was a positive or a negative thing? 
Jess: Yeah, good,  
I: what makes you think that it was a good thing?  
Jess: Because strangely despite everything that’s happened I’m actually a better person now.  
I: Better how, in what way?  
Jess: The way that I look at things, the way that I perceive things. I try and be a nicer person now 
towards people.  
… 
Jess: Erm, I used to be a very angry person. Quite angry and erm, I don’t know what the word is, quite 
aggressive towards some people. I’m not as aggressive now 
I: and you said it’s changed the way you looked at things as well?  
Jess: Yeah 
I: how’s it changed the way you look at things? 
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Jess: errmm, a little bit more open minded and more open to new things.” 
Kathryn 
“I: imagine, you’d not had these experiences, you’d not seen the visons how would your life be 
different? 
K: well it would just be boring to be quite honest. I’d just be plodding along getting through various 
experiences. This is going to change my life” 
 
“K: It’s altering me already its already started.  
I: And how do you think its altered you? 
K: It scares me a little  
I: It scares you a little, tell me a bit about that  
K: Well its all to do with change isn’t it. Changing my outlook on life.  
I: And how’s that changed, or how is that changing? 
K: It’s opened me up to the spirit world.” 
Rashid 
“R: And I think these thoughts the hallucinations they, in my experience they make me very negative. 
You know before was positive. You know the positive and the love and the affection towards people is 
replaced by negativity, anger, hatred.  
I: so its changed the way you feel about other people?  
R: and life, life in general, and you know society, the world.” 
John “I was pinned to the sofa (with fear) … and I’ve never been right since” 
Sally 
“I: is there anything that we’ve not talked about that you feel is important? 
S: No I think you’ve asked lots about what I’ve seen, I think it’s really important because I just want it all 
to stop really. I mean what has happened and that, its like as if (voice starts to break) my whole life has 





Appendix L: A Concluding Note on Reflexivity 
Engaging with IPA and the participants’ experience of psychosis has shifted my 
ontological position along a continuum; moving from a critical realist position at 
the outset towards the relativist during analysis, reflecting the varied accounts of 
reality in participants interviews, before moving back towards the critical realist, 
albeit slightly closer to relativism. The double hermeneutic has made it clear to 
me that there is no Archimedean point from which an experience can be 
objectively observed. 
 
